BEHIND AN EYE BLINK: A NEW EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTENTIONAL ACTION by C.C. Derchi
1 
 
 
SCUOLA DI DOTTORATO 
Filosofia e Scienze dell’Uomo 
DIPARTIMENTO 
Filosofia 
CORSO DI DOTTORATO  
XXX ciclo 
 
Behind an eye blink: 
a new empirical perspective on intentional action 
CHIARA-CAMILLA DERCHI 
                Supervisors:                                                                         
MARCELLO MASSIMINI 
SILVIA CASAROTTO 
 
 
A.A. 2016/2017 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Non chiedermi parole oggi non bastano.  
Stanno nei dizionari: sia pure imprevedibili  
nei loro incastri, sono consunte voci.  
È sempre un prevedibile dejà vu.  
Vorrei parlare con te - è lo stesso con Dio -  
tramite segni umbratili di nervi,  
elettrici messaggi che la psiche  
trae dal cuore dell'universo.  
Un fremere d'antenne, un disegno di danza,  
un infinitesimo battere di ciglia,  
la musica-ultrasuono che nemmeno  
immaginava Bach.   
Non chiedermi parole, oggi non bastano, Maria Luisa Spaziani. 
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Sommario 
 
Il “blink” o “batter d’occhi” è un movimento di rapida chiusura e riapertura delle 
palpebre. Il “blink” può essere un movimento spontaneo, riflesso o volontario. “Blink” 
con identiche caratteristiche cinematiche possono avere differenti origini e significati. 
Per esempio, un blink può essere spontaneo quando ha la funzione fisiologica di creare 
un film lacrimale evitando la seccazione della cornea, può essere riflesso in riposta a 
stimoli esterni ed infine può essere volontario per comunicare un messaggio attraverso 
un canale comunicativo preservato, per esempio quando un paziente locked in cerca di 
comunicare gioia, accordo o disaccordo, frustrazione attraverso gli occhi (Laureys et 
al., 2005). 
Lo scopo principale di questo studio è stato quello di trovare una misura oggettiva 
relativa alla distinzione tra un blink spontaneo e uno volontario: il “potenziale di 
preparazione” (Readiness Potential). 
Il presente studio è quindi rilevante per due ragioni: 
1. Nei soggetti sani, i blink spontanei appaiono con una frequenza di circa 1 ogni 5 secondi.  
Allo stesso tempo, i soggetti sani possono “controllare” il movimento spontaneo e 
riprodurlo in maniera intenzionale se opportunamente istruiti. In questo modo, il “blink” 
o “ammiccamento oculare” offre un contrasto ideale tra atto conscio e inconscio, a parità 
di cinematica. In questa prospettiva, l’analisi dell’attività cerebrale che precede un atto 
spontaneo o automatico messa a confronto con l’attività che precedere un “blink” 
volontario può offrire uno sguardo unico sui correlati neurali di un atto cosciente. 
2. Nei pazienti con gravi cerebrolesioni, il “blink” è spesso l’unico atto motorio che può 
essere individuato. È infatti impossibile per molti pazienti effettuare movimenti più 
complessi. Per questo motivo, attraverso un condizionamento operante in cui ad uno 
specifico comportamento viene associato un rinforzo positivo, il nostro scopo è quello 
di indirizzare i pazienti ad associare un determinato tipo di “blink”, opportunamente 
selezionato, con un rinforzo positivo rappresentato da voci familiari/amiche che si 
suppone possano avere una valenza emotiva positiva per il paziente. Nella prima parte 
della tesi verranno introdotte le premesse teorico/sperimentali alla base dello studio e 
verranno presentati i materiali e metodi e i risultati relativi alla popolazione di controllo 
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(soggetti sani). Nella seconda parte, verrà introdotto il “disturbo di coscienza” dal punto 
di vista clinico, il nuovo protocollo sperimentale applicato ai pazienti con disturbo di 
coscienza e i risultati preliminari. In conclusione, verranno valutate le potenzialità dello 
studio da un punto di vista teorico, da un punto di vista clinico/riabilitativo ed infine da 
un punto di vista etico. 
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Abstract  
 
Blinking is a rapid closing and opening of the eyelid. Eye blinks with identical 
kinematical features can have different origins and meanings. For example, one can 
blink automatically, due to a simple reflex arc – such as when moistening the cornea – 
or one can blink voluntarily to communicate a fundamental message – such as when a 
locked-in patient communicates that he/she is happy or frustrated (Laureys, et al., 2005) 
The main aim of the present project is to find a brain-based objective way to know 
whether a given blink is a meaningless automatic neural event or the endpoint of a 
complex conscious process. The proposal builds up on the empirical work by Kornhuber 
& Deecke and Benjamin Libet, who showed that the awareness of intention to move is 
preceded by a recordable cerebral activity called “Readiness Potential”.  
The present proposal is relevant for two reasons: 
1. In healthy subjects, automatic blinking occurs spontaneously every 5 seconds, or so. At 
the same time, healthy subjects can be instructed to blink voluntarily in a controlled 
fashion. In this way, blinking offers the ideal contrast between unconscious and 
conscious acts – the physical, kinematic aspects of the movement being equal. In this 
perspective, analyzing brain activity prior to automatic and voluntary blinks may offer 
a unique insight on the neural correlates of a conscious act. 
2. In patients with severe brain injuries blinking is often the only motor act that can be 
reliably detected. By employing operant conditioning, we aim at training patients on the 
association between a specific eyelid closure and a positive reinforcement. 
Specifically, Readiness Potential like activity will be computed on the cortical activity 
preceding eye blinking as a measure of “volition,” first in healthy controls and then in 
vegetative and minimally conscious state patients undergoing operant conditioning. 
In healthy controls, we will contrast spontaneous blinks against voluntary blinks. The 
results of this experiment are meant to explore the dynamic range of the changes in brain 
activity that underlies voluntary vs. spontaneous blinks in controlled conditions. 
In patients, detecting a progressive increase in the strength or complexity of brain 
activity (up to the levels obtained in healthy subjects during voluntary blinks) during the 
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course of the conditioning sessions will indicate that their blinking might reflect a 
voluntary act. 
Ultimately, this project, if successful, will link operant conditioning to the long-standing 
topic of the neural substrates of a wilful decision to act, bearing important 
scientific/ethical implications. 
The novelty of this project rests on: 
a. Exploring, empirically, the relationships between brain activity and the will. The 
underlying hypothesis guiding this project is that a wilful act should be reflected, to 
some measurable degree, in high levels of anticipatory brain dynamics. 
 
b. Taking Libet’s work one-step forward, by using slow cortical potentials such as the 
“Readiness Potential” as a neural marker of volition. 
c. Using the “Readiness Potential” to distinguish between spontaneous and voluntary 
blinks. 
 
d. Answering the critical question of whether the blinks produced by vegetative 
patients after a conditioning protocol are voluntary or not. 
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Introduction 
 
“She raised one hand and flexed its fingers and wondered, as he had sometimes before, 
how this thing this machine for gripping, this fleshy spider on the end of her arm, came 
to be hers, entirely at her command. Or did it have some little life of its own? She bent 
her finger and straightened it. The mystery was in the instance before it moved, the 
dividing movement between not moving and moving, when her intention took effect. It 
was like a wave breaking. If she could only find herself at the crest, she thought, she 
might find the secret of herself, that part that was really in charge. She brought her 
forefinger closer to her face and stared at it, urging it to move. It remained still 
because she was pretending, she was not entirely serious, and because willing it to 
move, or being about to move it, was not the same as actually moving it. And when she 
did crook it finally, the action seemed to start in the finger itself, not in some part of 
her mind. When did it know to move, when did she know to move it?” 
Ian McEwan, Atonement 
 
The study of volition is tightly linked with the notion of consciousness. In this thesis, 
I will approach the notion of volition from a neuroscientific perspective. I will use the 
term “volition” and “intentionality” as synonymous, in a naïve way, simply to refer to 
conscious acts performed and thus intentioned by the subject him/herself both as self-
initiated or self-paced. This thesis is based on the idea that there is a difference, in 
terms of neural activity, between intentional movements and non-intentional 
movements. The experience of an intentional action makes a difference in the brain.  
Chapter 1 is based on the theoretical investigation of “Slow Cortical Potentials,” the 
class of brain potentials usually connected with brain preparatory processes. In 
particular, I focused on a specific slow cortical potential, the “Readiness Potential,” 
that starting from the pioneering work of Kornhuber & Deecke is associated with 
intentional/self-paced movements. The Readiness Potential received greater attention 
since the seminal work of Libet, who demonstrated that the specific time course of this 
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potential is not compatible with the concept of “free will.”1 Basically the Readiness 
Potential, as “neural signature of volition” appeared well before the subject became 
conscious of the intention to move. To what extent conscious activity is causally 
relevant for the action remains an open question of scientific and philosophical 
relevance, but this will not be directly addressed in this thesis. Rather, I will discuss 
how the different interpretations of the Readiness Potential could provide information 
about different aspects of volitional movements. 
Chapter 2 presents the description of spontaneous, voluntarily, and reflex eye blinks 
in human physiology.  
In Chapter 3, I will present a new empirical setup aiming at distinguishing between a 
spontaneous and intentional movement, namely “eye blink” (Chapter 2), in healthy 
control subjects. The importance of the “eye blink”, as one of the few motor acts that 
can be executed both spontaneously and voluntarily, has increased in the light of the 
results obtained from healthy subjects. Intentional blinks are differentiated from 
spontaneous blinks, in that the Readiness Potential activity emerges just before 
intentional eye blinks, and not for spontaneous eye blinks.  
Results from the experiment and their relevance in the context of the state of art will 
be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
In Chapter 6, I will introduce the peculiar medical condition defined as “Disorder of 
Consciousness” (DOC). After a theoretical characterization of this condition, I will 
explain why such condition requires a specific and tailored examination both from the 
behavioural and from the neural perspectives.  
Starting from healthy subjects’ results, I will then describe how the “eye-blink 
protocol” is applied to one DOC patient and one Locked-in Syndrome patient (LIS). 
This study has clinical, theoretical and ethical implications. I will discuss the 
importance of our study in light of the existent field of research on patients with 
disorder of consciousness.  
Finally, in Chapter 7 I will present some results derived from the study of the 
Readiness Potential for voluntary eye blink in epileptic patients stereotactically 
                                                          
1 This is a theoretical inference derived from Libet’s experiments; it is not directly 
showed by Libet’s empirical results. On the contrary, Libet claimed that Readiness 
Potential is compatible with free will. 
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implanted with depth multi-lead electrodes (SEEG). The study of the Readiness 
Potential from a different perspective—that is, intracranial activity—can in fact shed 
light on the actual origin of such slow cortical potentials. 
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Part 1. Introduction to slow cortical potentials and Eye-Blink 
Chapter 1  
1.1 Slow cortical potentials 
Slow cortical potentials (SCP) are described as electrical potentials recorded from the 
scalp with a frequency below 1Hz. They are also referred to as DC-potentials 
(amplifier no high-pass filter –low cut off). They do not represent rhythmic activity, 
in fact they may change within a period of a few hundred millisecond up to several 
seconds (fluctuations not oscillations). (Caton, 1875) 
Cortical generators of slow cortical potential are identified in excitatory postsynaptic 
potentials (EPSPs) at the apical dendrites of vertical arranged pyramidal neurons in 
the cortex. They have a large distribution since these neurons have large distance 
connections.  
While SCPs are always present, they show specific characteristics if they are recorded 
time-locked to a stimulus as event related potential (ERP) (Birbaumer et al. 1990)  
Principal “Slow Cortical Potentials” are: 
1. SNW (slow negative wave) – it follows an unexpected stimulus, resulting in an 
orienting response 
2. SPN (stimulus preceding negativity) – sustained negativity over parietal and frontal 
cortex during the waiting period for a feedback stimulus after a time estimation task 
(Brunia, 1988) 
3. CNV (contingent negative variation) – when the first stimulus indicates the 
occurrence of the second stimulus. CNV can be recorded in the inter-stimulus interval. 
(Walter, 1964)2 (see Figure 1) 
                                                          
2 In 1964 slow cortical potentials received a great attention. In fact, while Kornhuber 
and Deecke theorized for the first time the existence of a recordable brain activity 
preceding voluntary movement (“Readiness Potential”), Walter, a British 
neurophysiologist, created protocol to elicit a different potential called “Contingent 
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4. BP/RP (readiness potential) – it precedes a voluntary movement of approximately 
1/1.5sec.         
 
Figure 1. Contingent Negative Variation (CNV) elicited by a Warning Stimulus (S1) 
and a Go-signal Stimulus (S2) 
1.1.1 Readiness potential, or Bereitschaftspotential: a slow negative potential before 
self-paced movements 
Since Hans Helmut Kornhuber and Luder Deecke’s seminal work a huge amount of 
empirical evidence was collected in order to demonstrate that well before an 
intentional action occurs, a significant activity – a negative slow voltage in EEG signal 
– appears in specific brain regions, namely motor cortex and supplementary motor 
area.  
                                                          
Negative Variation (CNV)”. The idea is to present two stimuli, a conditional stimulus 
indicating that after 1 or 2 sec an imperative stimulus is going to be presented. 
“Contingent Negative Variation” is described as the Event Related Potential (ERP) 
that appears between these two stimuli. In particular, Walter described a negative 
potential that appears immediately after the conditional response and endures until the 
imperative response, after which it decreases immediately or becomes positive. 
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The context of the discovery, as usually happens for some lucky findings in science, 
was pretty casual. In the spring of 1964, while discussing about brain research over a 
lunch break in “Gasthaus zum Schwanen,” at the foot of the Schlossberg hill in 
Freiburg, Kornhuber and Deecke –a Tenured Professor and a Ph.D. student, 
respectively– found themselves agreeing on a very simple fact. At that time brain 
investigations were mainly focused on the analysis of passive states of the brain or the 
sensory evoked brain potentials. What was lacking was a specific examination of 
active states, in particular self-initiated actions. Starting from that moment, their work 
was focused on the creation of an experimental setup aiming at characterizing the 
peculiar aspects of intentional action in terms of brain activity. The simple but 
powerful idea was to collect a series of intentional movements (each movement 
corresponding to a trial), for example finger flexions, and to average out brain activity 
time-locked to the onset of each movement.  
From the average of at least 40 trials (e.g. finger or wrist flexions) they found a specific 
surface negative slow potential appearing 1/1.5 sec before movements. This specific 
activity was then called “Bereitschaftspotential,” the German word for “Readiness 
Potential.”  
The “Readiness Potential” is a slow cortical negative voltage that appears with a 
frequency below 1 Hz. This means that compared to other well known potentials, such 
as “alpha rhythm,” the Readiness Potential is ten to a hundred times or slower. The 
direct implication is that the Readiness Potential is not clearly visible from a single 
trial, the average of different trials is necessary in order for this potential to appear. 
Moreover, it is usually best visible only when the EEG recording is acquired in DC 
(direct current). A DC amplifier does not omit any low frequencies (no high-pass 
filter/low cut-off) and the DC component of the signal is captured along with all the 
rest.  
For this reason, such slow changes in the EEG had been disregarded for a long time. 
Moreover, while slow cortical potentials are always present, they show a specific 
characteristic if they are recorded time-locked to a stimulus such as an event related 
potential. The clever idea from Kornhuber and Deecke was to use the self-paced or 
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intentional movement as the event, and then average out brain activity prior to that 
movement.  
There are small potentials hidden in the rhythmic activity of the human EEG 
that can only be recorded if they are reproducible and time-locked to a 
certain event capable of triggering an averaging computer. 
 (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1976) 
In Kornhuber and Deecke’s experimental protocol, the subjects are instructed to 
perform their movements at irregular intervals based on their own will (i.e. they had 
to move out of free will). In this protocol movements are internally driven without any 
external cues. This protocol is usually referred as “self-paced” protocol because the 
subject has to decide “when to move” of his/her own volition. It is worth noting that 
subjects are explicitly asked to avoid rhythmic activity and they are asked to make 
movements at irregular intervals in order to preserve the “volitional” aspect of action, 
otherwise there is a risk to create an automatism. In self-paced protocols, as the one 
developed by Kornhuber and Deecke the action does not have to be pre-planned but it 
has to emerge as the actual product of free will or intentionality. In this respect, this is 
the first scientific protocol that tries to operationalize volition based on the intuition of 
following the development of intentional action not only from the response, but also 
by looking at what happens in the brain well before the response itself occurs.  
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Figure 2. Different parts of Readiness Potential: Early RP, Late RP, Motor Potential 
(MP), Reafferent Potential (RAP). All these potentials are also commonly named 
“movement-related cortical potentials” (MRCPs) 
As shown in figure 2, the Readiness Potential seems to be composed by two different 
parts. The early part of the RP is a slowly rising phase of the waveform, while the late 
RP is an abrupt change in the slope of the wave. These two different parts of the wave 
are usually denominated “BP, early BP, BP1 and negative slope 1 (NS1),” and “late 
BP, BP2, NS’, NS2,” respectively. After movement, there is a specific pattern that is 
usually referred to as the “Reafferent Potential” (RAP), as shown in Figure 2. 
The early, late, and motor potential differ in terms of distribution over the scalp. The 
early part of the RP is bilaterally symmetrical, while the late and motor potential are 
asymmetrically distributed and maximal over the contralateral precentral areas.  
Different parts of the Readiness Potential are meant to reflect different levels of 
intentionality at the brain level. Since Benjamin Libet’s groundbreaking investigations 
(see Section 1.1.1) the early part of the RP is usually considered to start unconsciously 
and it might represent a general mechanism of arousal that indicates that the brain is 
starting to prepare for the future movement. The late part of the RP is associated with 
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the action itself, and it seems to reflect the volitional aspect of the movement, as it is 
absent for automatic or non-intentional movements. The “Motor Potential” (MP) is 
totally related to movement, regardless of whether it is pre-planned or not. It can be 
present both if the movement appears as the endpoint of a complex cascade of neuronal 
and cognitive events, and if the movement seems to be performed without any specific 
pre-planning, out of the blue.  
The Reafferent potential (RAP), might account for the somatosensory feedback 
deriving from the match between the intended movement and the actual movement 
performed.  
To estimate the precise localization of generator sources of the RP various studies have 
been conducted with several dipole source localization techniques.3 The main 
hypothesis about likely generators of the RP is that the early RP starts first in the 
supplementary motor area (SMA), shortly after in the lateral premotor cortices 
bilaterally, until the activation of M1 and the premotor cortex for the generation of the 
late RP (NS’) at about 400 ms before the movement onset. Then, just before the 
movement onset, the late BP culminates in MP in M1.  
The early RP is mostly modulated by cognitive functions, such as the level of intention, 
movement selection, and preparatory state, while the late RP is sensitive to the 
movement’s features, such as discreteness, precision and complexity. 
In general, the Readiness Potential can be influenced by several factors, such as:  
● Preparatory state (see Libet’s distinction between type I and II of the RP; see Figure 
4) 
● Movement selection (freely selected vs. fixed) 
● Learning and skill acquisition 
● Pace of movement repetition 
● Praxis movement 
                                                          
3 Nagamine et al. 1996; Cui and Deecke, 1999; Toma et al., 2002; Kornhuber and 
Deecke 2003 
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● Perceived effort 
● Force exerted 
● Speed and precision of movement 
● Discreteness and complexity of movement 
● Pathological lesions of various brain structures  
The Readiness Potential should be regarded as a complex and dynamic phenomenon. 
It is very difficult to isolate a single component or the specific processes involved in 
the movement. For example, as suggested by Jahanashi,4 it is possible that different 
frontal and prefrontal areas differentially contribute to the various cognitive, 
motivational, and motor processes involved in the RP. It might be that while the 
prefrontal area is engaged in the decision-making process for response selection, 
timing or initiation of action, the pre-SMA/cingulate motor area and lateral premotor 
cortex may be involved in the preparatory processes. This can be in contrast to the 
activation of the SMA proper and motor cortex, which may be most likely associated 
with the actual initiation, and execution of movement. To this purpose, it could prove 
pivotal to develop specific tasks, with the aim to disentangle different concurrent 
processes in volitional action. 
1.1.2 Benjamin Libet and the unconscious preparation of self-initiated voluntary 
movement 
In 1983 the psychologist Benjamin Libet replicated Kornhuber & Deecke’s 
experiment, while adding a modification of the protocol. He asked subjects to indicate 
on a rotating cathode ray oscilloscope (CRO) (Figure 3) the position of a moving bright 
dot when he/she was aware of the conscious decision to move a finger (W-time). The 
quadrangle of the oscilloscope was divided into 60 parts, such as those of a clock, but 
each lap lasted 2.56 seconds, so every second corresponded actually to 43 
milliseconds. The experiment is conducted in this way: for each subject the EMG 
activity is recorded to detect the starting point of the movement (finger or wrist 
                                                          
4 Jahanshahi et al., 2001. 
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flexion) trough specific EMG electrodes. Simultaneously also recorded EEG activity 
trough EEG cap. After each movement – that corresponds to a trial5 – the subject has 
also to report after the execution of the movement when he/she became consciously 
aware of the decision to move the finger. In particular, he/she has to bear in mind and 
then report after each trial the dot position on oscilloscope when he/she felt the urge 
to move. Subjects are specifically instructed not to target a particular time interval as 
the time of their movement, but rather to “let the urge to act appear on its own at any 
time without any preplanning or concentration on when to act” (Libet, 1983). For this 
reason, these kinds of movements are classified as “self-initiated” to distinguish them 
from “self-paced” ones, in order to stress the fact the self-initiated movements seem 
to be carried out by the subject’s free will, i.e., without any concern about when to 
act.6 
 
 
Figure 3, Cathode ray oscilloscope 
                                                          
5 For each subject blocks of 40 trials (on average) are recorded. 
6 In Kornhuber & Deecke’s protocol subjects produce self-paced movements at 
irregular intervals; they are also required to vary the intervals between movements and 
to keep intervals between two consecutive movements within certain limits. In 
contrast, in Libet’s protocol movements have to be performed just by following the 
“urge to move”. 
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If we assume that the Readiness Potential reflects the neural preparation for voluntary 
movement, then what Libet found is a gap between neural preparation to act and the 
conscious will to act. Specifically, the subject’s reported a W-time (the time of will or 
the decision to move) that is/was systematically shifted about 500 ms after the rise of 
Readiness Potential and before the purely motor preparation (M-time). Libet also 
created a different set of tasks to systematically assess how the “preplanning” 
component might affect the duration of the RP. As showed in figure 4, pre-planned 
movements seem to be characterized by a longer RP (around 1000 ms before of action 
itself) in comparison with not pre-planned movements, where the RP appears around 
500 ms before the movement.  
What do these results mean? For the first time in modern neuroscience, an 
experimental protocol tried to demonstrate that a conscious decision does not cause 
the movement, but rather that the brain activity (the Readiness Potential) bringing 
about the movement starts before the individual wills anything to happen. 
Starting from these findings, a huge amount of literature was produced in order to 
discuss how Libet’s experiments might create a serious problem for free will. The 
existence of a neural indicator (RP) that appears before the conscious will to act seems 
in fact to challenge the common sense’s intuition about our free deliberation, or the 
folk-psychological notion of intention.7 
More recently, in 2011, Fried8 replicated Libet's findings at the scale of the single 
neuron. This experiment represents an important step towards a deeper understanding 
of volition. Intracranial data provide a unique contribution too, in that they can help 
explore the actual origin of Readiness Potential not only from the cortical areas but 
also from the subcortical structures, thereby providing reliable information about the 
Readiness Potential timing. On those specific patients, intracranial electrodes are used 
for evaluation prior to neurosurgery. Through depth electrodes it is possible to detect 
                                                          
7 Folk-psychology’s intuition about intention and motor acts is that intention is the 
cause of future action. In a hierarchical structure, intentions trigger a cascade of more 
concrete processes: from deliberation through intention, from the planning to the 
actual execution of the action. (Schurger & Uithol 2015) 
8 Fried et al. (2011) 
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the firing patterns of single neurons. Subject were asked to perform the same task as 
the one proposed by Libet, in order to reproduce the same experimental conditions. 
Results showed a gradual build-up of activity of a cluster of single neurons in the 
medial frontal lobe. Interestingly, Fried’s study suggested that a preconscious activity 
in the SMA at the level of single neurons was present prior to subject’s actual intention 
to move (W-time). As Fried wrote: “taken together, these findings lend support to the 
view that the experience of will emerges as the culmination of premotor activity –
probably in combination with networks in parietal cortex– starting several hundreds 
of ms before awareness.” However, “the scientific, philosophical and societal 
implications of these findings remain open for debate.”9 
What Libet’s and other similar experiments suggest (e.g. Soon et al., 2008, 2013) is in 
fact that our brain, rather than our subjectivity, is in charge when we decide to act. But 
is this the case? 
Libet himself did not want to push that way further, as he also made room for a veto 
(free won’t) over the alleged brain decision, before the action’s taking place. In this 
respect, the subject would keep control over the temporal dynamics of his/her 
voluntary action, and has therefore free will to decide whether to do it or not. The 
following figure from Banks and Pockett, 2007 summarizes well Libet’s findings: 
 
                                                          
9 Fried et al. (2011) 
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Figure 4. Preplanned vs no preplanned acts: Type I RP, Type II RP 
 
1.1.3 Volition and self-paced protocols 
This is not the place to discuss in depth the issue of free will and all its possible 
theoretical implications. However, it is important to mention a few possible criticisms 
to Libet’s findings: 
1. These experiments do not probe directly the decision to move or not to move, but 
rather the decision about when to follow an instruction.  
2. Simple motor acts, such as finger flexion, are not the right paradigm for the 
investigation of free will. These acts cannot catch the complexity and the dynamical 
aspects of actions from which free will emerges.  
3. Much longer timescales or real dynamic environment are the significant context where 
to test assumptions about free will. 
In general, Libet-like experiments can be seen as an attempt to operationalize free will. 
The experimental environment is restricted and deals with very few variables in 
comparison to the complex and multi-faceted aspects of every day life's decision-
making.  
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In addition, in Libet-like protocols the understanding of voluntary action is restricted 
to self-paced or self-initiated movements, which represent a specific class of actions. 
As showed in figure 5 below, a plethora of different movements can be grouped in 
different types. Along a hypothetical continuum that goes from reflex movements to 
goal directed movements, self-paced movements partially reflect heterogeneous 
aspects of volition.  
 
Figure 5. An hypothetical continuum of volitional movements 
Voluntary movements can be sub-grouped in three class: cued or stimulus-driven 
actions, self-initiated/self-paced, and goal directed.  As showed in table 6, in self-paced 
or self-initiated protocol the subject has to decide “when” to move. The given 
instruction “move your finger when you feel the urge to move” can be in fact 
interpreted as “decide when to move.” The task is restricted to the fact that: 
1. The subject has to move sooner or later; the decision about whether to move is 
therefore not taken in account by the subject. 
2. She/he knows which movement has to do or what to do; the choice is not related to the 
type of movement to execute.  
3. The only free choice seems to be the one about when to move.  
A more comprehensive account of voluntary movements needs to take in account 
different aspects of volition or decision. It can be useful to build a better theoretical 
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schema of what are the characteristics of voluntary action. For example, a hypothetical 
continuum of voluntary action whose extremes are represented by the self-paced 
protocol on one side, and cued-actions on the other side as shown in table 6, can be 
constructed in order to best understand which processes are needed for the 
manifestation of voluntary action. 
 
 
Figure 6. Self-paced vs Stimulus Driven Actions 
As shown in the table 6, manipulating the “when” variable results in two different 
potentials: Readiness Potential and Contingent Negative Variation (CNV).  
Traditionally, self-initiated actions are taken to differ from cued-actions in that while 
in self-initiated actions the decision about when to move is internally driven by the 
subject, in the cued protocol the cue is externally driven. In the stimulus-driven 
protocol, the trigger of movement is outside the subject. 
Externally driven actions are in fact forced with respect to the time (a cue can signal 
when to move as in the CNV protocol), or with respect to the “whether”-choice (for 
example in the Go/No-go protocol, a test that requires a participant to perform an 
action given certain stimuli e.g., press a button – Go— and to inhibit that action under 
a different set of stimuli —e.g., not press that same button - No-Go. 
The “what” dimension can affect the decision-making process, but it does not seem 
crucial in volition. The choice of what to move seems in fact to represent a further 
dimension in the volitional process, one that appears before the “when”- and the 
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“whether”- decision. The Lateralized Readiness Potential (LRP), which is associated 
with unilateral hand movement, appears as a negative slope more prominent over the 
motor cortex contralateral to the chosen hand. The LRP usually appears after the early 
RP in the late part of the RP as a final choice relative to the side of movement to 
perform. 
Regarding the CNV and the RP, they appear as potentials with a similar morphology. 
Conceivably, both the RP and the CNV deal with “volition” in different manners. The 
RP is presumably elicited by self-paced/self-initiated protocols, while the CNV 
emerged in cued protocols. 
Self-paced and stimulus-driven action can be described as two species of the same 
genus: volitional acts.  
Goal-oriented actions are instead a more complex behaviour to test experimentally; 
they represent in fact dynamic aspects of action, usually requiring long-term decision 
making, whose composite temporal-dimension is difficult to replicate in the 
experimental environment. 
Summarizing, in the experimental protocols regarding volitional actions, manipulated 
variables are the “when,” “whether,” and “what” variables. In particular, the “when” 
variable seems to be crucial both in self-paced protocols and in stimulus-driven 
protocols. 
1.1.4 Different routes for the same potential? 
Several neuroimaging studies10 comparing the neural activity for self-paced actions 
and stimulus driven actions found that the activation of the pre-SMA is stronger for 
self-paced actions than for stimulus-driven ones. As Haggard pointed out,11 the starting 
point of the Readiness Potential is seen as the initiation “of a cascade of neural 
activity” that flows from the pre-SMA back to the SMA proper and the M1 (see Figure 
7, left side). However, the pre-SMA itself has to be triggered in order to produce the 
neural activity cascade. It has been suggested that the basal ganglia can convey inputs 
                                                          
10 Jenkins I.H. et al., (2000); Deiber M. P et al., (1999) 
11 Haggard P., (2008) 
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to the pre-SMA. Intracranial studies12 showed that the RP could be recordable also 
from subcortical sites; in particular, the RP in the basal ganglia preceded the onset of 
movement by 1500 ms. As shown in figure 7 (right side) information from early 
sensory cortices (S1) is linked to a level-representation in the parietal cortex in order 
to orientate goal-directed movements, such as grasping. This has been suggested as a 
plausible network for stimulus-driven actions.  
 
  
Figure 7. Brain pathways for voluntary action: on the left side the brain circuit for 
self-paced action, on the right side the brain circuit for stimulus-driven action 
(Haggard, 2008) 
In conclusion, the specific shape of the Readiness Potential can be explained, as 
showed in Figure 7 (right side), by an activation of the prefrontal cortex, in which 
deliberation takes place, followed by the pre-SMA, where the action is planned 
together with other pre-motor areas. Immediately before the action takes place, there 
is an activation of the M1 (that is specific in respect of the side of the 
movement).(Figure 8) 
                                                          
12 Rektor I., (2008) 
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Figure 8. Lateralized Readiness Potential (LRP) 
1.1.5 The Readiness Potential’s slippery slope13 
In the free-will debate there are at least two categories of interpretation regarding the 
nature of the “Readiness Potential:”  
1. The Classical view: the RP is the neural signature of volition – or the RP causes the 
action (Kornhuber & Deecke, Libet)14 (Figure 9) 
2. The Alternative view: the RP is not causally related to volitional act – the RP might 
correlate with the voluntary action (Schurger)15 (Figure 9) 
                                                          
13 The Slippery slope argument, in logic, is the fallacy of arguing that a certain course 
of action is undesirable or that a certain proposition is implausible because it leads to 
an undesirable or implausible conclusion via a series of tenuously connected premises, 
each of which is understood to lead, causally or logically, to the premise (or 
conclusion) that follows it. Sometimes the same fallacy is also called “domino fallacy” 
precisely because we can never know if a whole series of events and/or a certain result 
is determined to follow one event or action in particular. 
 Here, we use “slippery slope” as a word pun where the slope is represented by the 
characteristic shape of the Readiness Potential and the adjective “slippery” refers to 
the “standard” interpretation of the negative rising slope preceding a voluntary 
movement that, starting from Libet, was interpreted as the causally deterministic 
process taking place before the occurrence of a voluntary act. 
14 Kornhuber & Deecke (1965) 
15 Schurger, A., (2012) 
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2.1 The RP appears also for invertebrates before spontaneous (non-intentional) initiation 
of movement (Kagaya &Takahata)16 
 
The interpretation of Readiness Potential in Libet’s framework has been already 
discussed in section 1.1.1; here the alternative interpretation to the “classical” view of 
the Readiness Potential will be described.   
 
       Figure 9. The Classical and the Alternative interpretation of the Readiness Potential 
           The “alternative” view generates from the intuition that: 
A gradual increase in neural activity preceding spontaneous17movements 
appears to be a very general phenomenon, common to both vertebrates and 
invertebrates alike.18 
The actual nature of the Readiness Potential can be understood, according to Schurger, 
only if we discard our common intuitions about free will and causation. The Readiness 
Potential is not the neural sign, nor the neural mechanism of volition, but it should be 
interpreted as a general (not specific) fluctuation of the EEG activity.19 The RP appears 
                                                          
16 Kagaya K., Takahata M., (2010) 
 
17 The term “spontaneous” in this specific framework refers to a non-intentional 
movement. 
18 Schurger, A., (2012) 
19 This idea is already present in some other authors as Eccles (1985): “there is a 
tendency for the initiation of movement to occur during the excitatory phase of the 
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in fact only if we average out different trials, as it is very unlikely to detect the RP at 
a single trial. Fluctuations of the EEG activity are present both during the rest-activity 
(no task-condition) and during the voluntary movement. Even though these 
fluctuations can contribute to voluntary movement, they are not the cause of it.  
Taking in mind the assumption that neural activity might undergo spontaneous 
fluctuations,20 and borrowing from “decision-making” theories the notion of 
“accumulator models,”21 Schurger postulated that voluntary movements occur 
whenever there is enough accumulation of evidence in order for the neural activity to 
reach the threshold, in lack of any external cue. But what is the origin of the evidence? 
In Libet’s task, the subject is instructed not to pre-plan the action but to move whenever 
he/she feels the urge to move, so the evidence is based on a “weak imperative to 
move.” In other words, there is an implicit imperative during all task: subjects are free 
to move whenever they want but they have to move at some point. Moreover, if the 
imperative to move is weak, the precise moment at which the decision (threshold) is 
crossed is determined by spontaneous sub-thresholds fluctuations in neural activity. In 
order to test empirically this model, Schurger created the “Libetus interruptus” task. 
The task is identical to the classical Libet’s task, with the addition of a few random 
interruptions: an audio tone (click) that “forces” the subject to move as fast as possible 
after the sound. The model predicts that faster reaction times were preceded by a 
negative-going voltage deflection before the movement onset. In other words, faster 
reaction times are obtained if the neural activity is closer to the postulated threshold. 
                                                          
random spontaneous activity.” Schurger’s theoretical framework is based on Eccles’ 
suggestion regarding the existence of spontaneous fluctuations in global activity of 
large populations of cortical neurons; these fluctuations can be present either without 
any intention or movement, or to facilitate and allow a movement.  
20 Spontaneous fluctuations in the brain can be understood as 1/f noise or auto-
correlated noise (pink noise). This means that faster fluctuations are smaller in 
amplitude or that there is a diminishing power for higher frequency. In some studies, 
“channel noise” in neurons, which is thought to arise from the random opening and 
closing of ion channels in the cell membrane, is seen to be 1/f.  
21 In accumulator models a response is triggered when a signal that represents the 
decision process (activation function) grows over time to reach a threshold level. 
(See Hanes & Schall, 1996)  
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This build-up even preceded random unpredictable cues; in this respect, the RP cannot 
reflect  the preparation of movement.22 
In this new framework, the Readiness Potential is not a unique phenomenon directly 
linked with voluntary action, but it is best characterized as composed by two parts. 
The first part is primarily based on stochastic fluctuations, while the last part –around 
150 ms before of the movement that coincides approximately with W-time— is purely 
motoric, in the sense that it is linked with the movement and it can be seen as pure 
“motor preparation.” 
As Gomes noticed well before Schurger’s argument:  
[…] the hypothesis that spontaneous fluctuations in the global activity of 
large populations of cortical neurons, such as those reflected in the earlier 
part of the RP, should regularly occur, independently of any intention or 
movement, so as to allow the production of voluntary acts […] would be very 
difficult to test, due to the absence of a common reference time from which 
to average different EEG tracings of subject at rest. […].  
In fact, in a single EEG tracing the RP itself is not visible. […] One needs to 
average many EEG tracings to obtain the RP, and a common reference time 
is necessary for this (in the case of voluntary acts, it is the movement onset 
time). At present, there seems to be no way of testing this hypothesis, but in 
principle it should be testable.23 
In addition to, and in line with, Schurger’s perspective, different authors stressed the 
idea that the Readiness Potential might not reflect just pure motor preparation.24 
Mixing trials where the subject decided to choose a letter in a stream of letter (rapid 
serial visual presentation (RSVP)) with no movement, and trials where decision is 
matched with a movement, these authors found that the Readiness Potential occurred 
                                                          
22 A critique to this conclusion derives from the fact that subject – even if the cue is 
unpredictable – is always waiting for a cue to happen. Slow cortical potentials 
(described in Chapter 1) and in particular SPN can be found in the waiting time for a 
pending cue. The RP like shape found before an unpredictable cue can be also 
explained in this way. Unpredictable does not mean unexpected.  
23 Gomes, G., (1999) 
24 Alexander P., (2015) 
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also in the absence of movement, and that motor-based processes did not significantly 
modulate the Readiness Potential.25 In this empirical framework the RP is not seen as 
the reflection of purely motor preparation, but it may represent a wider phenomenon 
of anticipation.  
1.1.6 A biological mechanisms? 
Another possible interpretation of the Readiness Potential is provided by several 
authors, in particular by the work of Kagaya & Takahata,26 who showed that also in 
invertebrates, in particular in crayfish, spontaneous initiation of movement (walking) 
is preceded by readiness discharge neurons that become active more than 1 sec before 
walking, while they remain inactive at the onset of the mechanical stimulus-evoked 
walking. The assumption is that animals can initiate behaviour not only in response to 
an external stimulus, but also “voluntarily”, depending on their internal state. Brain 
neurons active before of spontaneous initiation of movement in crayfish follow a 
similar temporal dynamic of the Readiness Potential in human animal. The authors in 
fact called this activity “readiness discharge”. The Readiness Discharge is not 
associated with any specific direction of walking. Other specific neurons are active 
after the Readiness Discharge. This suggests a hierarchical control for the spontaneous 
activations of walking. Moreover, Kagaya & Takahata found brain neurons whose 
activities increase during walking and others that are active at the termination of 
walking. This also suggested a hierarchical organization of spontaneous walking in 
crayfish, from behavioural initiation to continuation and termination. In addition, 
intracellular studies showed that Readiness Discharges are based on sequential 
excitatory and inhibitory synaptic inputs rather than on endogenous excitability 
changes. 
Another different perspective might highlight the classical view of the RP, which is 
based on cognitive and cortical phenomena. Since the crayfish is an invertebrate, and 
as such has no cortex and very few characteristics similar to the mammalian motor 
system, even though it seems to share the same mechanism of neuronal readiness 
                                                          
25 This is also true for other slow cortical potentials such as CNV and SPN (See 
Brunia, 1988 – 1991) 
26 Kagaya K., Takahata M., (2010) 
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before a self-initiated movement, a comprehensive account of self-initiated actions 
needs to comprise also this aspect: the RP can be a biological mechanism that does not 
entail consciousness or volition 
It is hard to understand what “spontaneous initiation” amounts to in the case of the 
crayfish, but it might be possible that the analogous neuronal mechanisms of the 
“readiness discharge” and the “readiness potential” can be described as a general 
neuronal mechanism or neuronal triggers for motor initiation. It might be a biological 
mechanism independent from any conscious control. This could explain Libet’s gap 
between neural decision and conscious awareness of decision. What differentiates the 
Readiness Discharge from the Readiness Potential, then, might be the emergence of 
agency or the feeling of awareness of intention, which makes a difference between 
invertebrates and human animals. At the same time, the specific localizations, in 
different cortical areas of the human brain, that are active before the intentional action, 
cannot be negligible. Voluntary action seems to be encoded in the brain with a specific 
temporal and hierarchical dynamic.  
What is interesting, with regard to the Readiness Discharge in the crayfish, is the 
absence of this neuronal activity for externally-triggered movements, suggesting that 
the Readiness Discharge process might be specific to spontaneous/freely deliberated 
movements. This suggestion could be of potential interest to best characterize the 
differences between humans’ self-paced and stimulus driven actions.  
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Chapter 2 
2.1 Eyeblink types 
In healthy subjects, automatic blinking occurs spontaneously every 5 seconds, or so. 
The eyelids constitute a protective barrier between the cornea and anything that might 
inflict damage from the outside world. If the cornea loses its transparency, eyesight 
will be compromised or altogether destroyed. In order to prevent such a thing from 
happening we are equipped with several types of blinks. Blinks can occur either 
voluntarily, spontaneously or as a reflex in response to external stimulation. In 
addition, blinks can also be a learned response, like in eyeblink conditioning. Different 
pathways control the different types of blinks, although some overlaps occur. 
Regarding the kinematic properties, voluntary, spontaneous and reflex blinks have 
very similar features (Evinger, Manning and Sibony, 1991). 
 
Reflex blinks are the fastest types of blinks and can be evoked in numerous ways. All 
reflex blinks are elicited by external stimuli; the three primary sensory modalities 
activated in reflex blinking include tactile, optic and acoustic sensations. Several reflex 
blinks can be distinguished. Reflex blinks can be divided into two categories, the 
trigeminal and non-trigeminal blinks. Tactile threats to the eye are likely to be 
perceived in the facial area which is innervated by the trigeminal nerve. The trigeminal 
reflexes are the corneal, ciliary (eyelash) reflex and supra-orbital reflex, evoked by 
electrical stimulation or glabellar tapping, are trigeminal reflexes. Corneal and ciliary 
reflexes can also be induced by tactile stimulation or air puffs. Tactile stimuli outside 
the face and non-tactile stimuli can also threaten the eye, which is then protected by 
non-trigeminal reflex blinks. Blink reflexes evoked by non-trigeminal inputs are the 
somatosensory, acoustic, photic and optic blink reflexes. A somatosensory reflex can 
be induced by an electrical stimulus to peripheral nerves, for example the median nerve 
at the wrist (Miwa et al. 1995). An acoustic blink reflex can be evoked by sudden loud 
sounds. Photic blinks are elicited after exposure to light stimuli. In clinical practice 
blink reflexes are usually evoked by mechanical stimulation of the cornea or eye lashes 
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or with glabellar tapping or electrical stimulation of the supra-orbital branch of the 
trigeminal nerve (Majeurs et al., 2005; Thomas, 1994). 
 
Spontaneous blinks spread a protective tear film over the cornea in order to prevent 
the ocular surface from drying (Bour et al., 2000). The rate with which spontaneous 
blinks occur is thought to be determined by a generator. FMRI studies show activation 
in the right medial frontal gyrus possibly corresponding to the supplementary motor 
area when compared to blink inhibition activation and in Brodmann areas 7, 17 and 19 
compared to keeping the eyes closed during spontaneous blinking (Bardouille, Picton 
and Ross, 2006). This implicates a role for these areas in the generation of spontaneous 
blinks. Independent of the exact location, the generator controlling the spontaneous 
blink rate appears to be influenced by several internal and external factors. 
Voluntary blinks are blinks initiated by conscious thought. Blinks are used to 
communicate, for instance to emphasize innocence or indicate that what you said is 
not very serious. Voluntary blinks are even used to replace speech by patients with 
severe motor paralysis. Several MRI studies have been conducted investigating blink-
related neuronal activation. Subjects showed bilaterally increased activation in the 
primary visual cortex, central thalamus, posterior putamen, and supplementary and 
primary motor cortex and cerebellum during voluntary blinking (Dimitrova et al. 
2002). 
 
2.2 Anatomical substrates  
In all types of eyelid movements, two skeletal eyelid muscles, the levator palpebrae 
superioris (LPS) and the orbicularis oculi (OO) muscles, and two smooth muscles, the 
superior tarsal and inferior tarsal muscles (Mu¨ller’s), are involved. In blinking, LPS 
and OO muscles act antagonistically (Bour, Aramideh, and De Visser, 2000; Evinger 
et al. 1991). Motoneurons in the central caudal subnucleus of the oculomotor complex 
innervate the LPS muscle, while OO muscle fibers receive their innervation from the 
intermediate zone of the facial nucleus (VanderWerf et al. 2003). During a blink, LPS 
motoneurons stop to fire briefly, while OO motoneurones produce a short burst, that 
in turns activates OO muscle fibers triggering a rapid lowering of the upper eyelid. 
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Stereotyped eye movements during blinking accompany eyelid movements. At the 
onset of a blink, the eye rotates normally from the initial position nasally downward 
and the extent of eye rotation depends on the initial eye position (Bour, Aramideh and 
De Visser, 2000) 
 
2.3 Blink kinematics 
2.3.1 Eyelid kinematics 
For all kind of blinks, muscle activity onset precedes eyelid movement onset with 
about 12 ms and the maximum velocity of the closing eyelid (down phase) is generally 
twice as high as the maximum velocity during eyelid opening (up phase) (Evinger et 
al. 1991). Reflex, voluntary and spontaneous blinks also have their own characteristics. 
For the reflex blink the largest burst of muscle activity is generated by very powerful 
simultaneous motorunit activation resulting in fast and strength eyelid closure and 
somewhat slower eyelid opening. The voluntary blink has a less significative but 
longer contraction of the OO muscle which creates a slower eyelid movement with an 
amplitude similar to a reflex blink. The spontaneous blink has the smallest muscle 
activity and therefore the slowest and smallest eyelid movement (Evinger et al. 1991, 
VanderWerf et al. 2003).  
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Fig. 10. Eyelid kinematics and Orbicularis Oculi muscle EMG activity associated 
with: (A) reflex, (B) voluntary and (C) spontaneous eyeblinks. Stim=stimulus artefact 
from electrical stimulation of the supra-orbital nerve; Amp=amplitude; 
Dur=duration; Vel=velocity (adapted from Evinger et al., 1991).  
2.3.2 Eye kinematics  
During blinking the eye rotates down towards the nose and back up again (Evinger et 
al., 1991). The blink appears to be a synchronic movement of both eyes and eyelids. 
Although when measured by means of electrophysiology, eye movement during 
voluntary blinks as well as reflex blinks is slightly asymmetric. Besides the rotation 
the eye is also displaced 1-2 mm back into the orbit during blinking (Evinger et al., 
1984). Eye movement during blinking is achieved through co-contraction of all 
extraocular muscles except the superior oblique. The exact shape of the rotation of the 
eye is dependent on the start position (Bour, Aramideh and De Visser 2000, Evinger 
et al. 1991). The eye usually comes back to the initial gaze position after a blink. Bour 
and co-workers (2000) found that for reflex blinks this was independent of the intensity 
of the stimulus that evoked a blink. In rabbits, for example, the latency for extraocular 
muscle activation is longer than for OO muscle activation and varies depending on the 
muscle and blink-evoking stimulus (Evinger and Manning 1993). 
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2.4 Neural correlates and pathways 
Most of the influence exerted by the higher order or supranuclear areas modulates the 
excitability of the blink, through for instance, descending cortical projections via the 
thalamus and superior colliculus (SC) via tecto-reticular projections (Basso, Powers 
and Evinger, 1996). Supranuclear projections involved in the act of blinking are 
distributed over several regions. FMRI studies revealed that the primary motor cortex, 
supplementary motor cortex, cingulated motor cortex and the central thalamus are 
active during spontaneous and voluntary blinking (Evinger and Perlmutter 2003). 
Direct projections have been described from the motor cortex to the facial nucleus and 
lateral medullary reticular formation (Jenny and Saper 1987). The basal ganglia can 
also influence reflex blinking through different pathways (Esteban 1999). For 
voluntary blinking, the neuronal circuit of eyelid movements is partly controlled by 
the neuronal blinking circuit, but for reflex blinking, the neuronal circuit of eyelid 
movements is more or less operating independently from the eye blink’s circuit. 
The upper face movements are controlled by multiple cortical motor regions, with 
specific involvement of the cingulate medial areas (CMAs) in the medial part of the 
frontal lobe, the primary motor areas (M1) and the lateral premotor areas (PMAs) 
(Hanakawa, Dimyan and Hallett, 2008). These areas contain also premotor neurons of 
the OOC (Orbicularis Oculi muscle), and from this stimulation might be obtained 
muscle activity from OOC (Sohn et al., 2004). The lateral precentral areas project 
predominantly to the contralateral lower facial muscles and relatively weakly, but 
consistently, to the upper facial musculature via the facial nucleus (Morecraft et al. 
2001). This projection accounts for the movement patterns elicited by cortical 
stimulation to the lateral cerebral hemisphere (Cohen and Hallett 1988; Paradiso et al. 
2005). Recent fMRI studies (Hanakawa, Dimyan and Hallett 2008; Hanakawa and 
Fukuyama, 2005) suggests that the motor representations of intentional bilateral 
blinking  (oculomotor representation) and the upper face movements are adjacent but 
segregated in the cingulate medial frontal areas, hence supporting the somatotopically 
organized multiple CMA scheme proposed by Pickard and Strick in 1996.  
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Part 2. Experimental Protocol on healthy subjects  
Chapter 3 
Blinking is a rapid closing and opening of the eyelid. Blinks with identical kinematical 
features can have different origins and meanings. In patients with severe brain injuries 
blinking is often the only motor act that can be reliably detected. The main aim of the 
present study is to find a brain-based objective way to know whether a given blink is 
a meaningless neural event or the endpoint of a complex conscious process. We build 
up mainly on Benjamin Libet empirical work who showed that the awareness of 
intention to move is preceded by a recordable cerebral activity called “Readiness 
Potential” starting about 700 ms before the movement. 
3.1 Participants 
Six participants (mean age 25.7 years; range: 25 to 27 years, 5 females) were tested at 
the Department of Biomedical and Clinical Sciences L.Sacco of the University of 
Milan. All participants gave their written informed consent to take part in the 
experiment, according to the Declaration of Helsinki. All had normal or corrected to 
normal visual acuity and did not wear glasses or contact lenses during the experiment. 
The experimental procedure was approved by the Ethics Commettee of the Ospedale 
Luigi Sacco Milano. 
3.2 Experimental protocol 
The subjects were seated in a comfortable chair in the experimental room and were 
just requested to look at a dark screen set 1,5 m away at eye level. The subject had to 
maintain a central gaze position and should avoid body and head movements as well 
as facial muscle contractions. The experiment consists of three phases: 
1. A “Spontaneous blink” phase to obtain the spontaneous blinks, used as control 
condition;  
This phase was always the first in order to maintain the participants unaware of the 
objective of the study and avoid attention focusing on the execution of spontaneous 
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eye blinks. In this phase no further instructions were given. The EEG recording starts 
when the subject considers himself/herself comfortably ready. Since we expect that 
each subject will blink spontaneously 10-15 times per minute on average (Evinger et 
al., 1991) a total of 120 minutes of recording was collected in order to obtain a total 
amount of at least 1000 spontaneous blinks. The whole recording was subdivided in 8 
sessions (15 minutes each one, to prevent fatigue). 
2. A voluntary “brisk” phase, during which the subject was required to blink as fast as 
possible.  
3. A voluntary “slow” session to obtain eyeblinks whose velocity should be as natural as 
possible with the only request to perform them intentionally.  
These last two phases were alternated. In the voluntary phases, the subject was 
required to intentionally blink at any time they feel like doing so and to try to avoid 
spontaneous blinks. Eye blinks had to be performed not too closely without 
implementing any strategy (e.g. counting, pacing). Both phases were preceded by a 
training session in which the participant learned to properly perform the required 
movement. The aim of the training session was also to minimize task-related cognitive 
efforts. The duration of each phase was at least 120 minutes (8 sessions, 15 minutes 
each) to obtain a number of eye blinks similarly to the spontaneous phase. 
3.3 Electrophysiology recording 
We used a 64-channel EEG amplifier (BrainAmp DC, Brain Products, Germany). 
Sixty surface electrodes were placed in a cap according to the International 10/20 
System. All electrodes were referenced to the linked earlobes and a ground electrode 
was placed on the forehead. Impedances were kept below 5 kΩ and the signal was 
acquired at a sampling rate of 5000 Hz (DC acquisition). Four out of 64 electrodes 
were used for EOG and EMG recording and positioned according to the most suitable 
placement for quantitative measurement eye blink detection according to Kaneko & 
Sakamoto (Kaneko & Sakamoto, 1999). To detect eye movements and identify the 
blink artifacts a vertical electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded by two electrodes 
placed above and below the right eye (in line with the pupil when the gaze was in 
central position). The EMG electrodes were located on the inferior portion of the 
Orbicularis oculi muscle to specifically detect the blink movement.  
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3.4 Data analysis 
Data analysis was performed with MatLab (Math Works Inc., R2015b) and the SSP 
BioMedical Data Analysis Package (SiSyPhus Project; Version 2.0e, 2.1e), developed 
by members and collaborators of TMS-EEG LAB of the Department of Biomedical 
and Clinical Sciences “Luigi Sacco”, University of Milan. 
All signals were filtered using a high-pass, 1st order finite impulse response (FIR) 
filter (corresponding to a detrend). 
3.4.1 Trigger positioning  
As a first step of the signal pre-processing, we used the onset of EMG activity related 
to the eye-blink as the trigger to identify each trial.  
To detect the eye blink onset, the EMG signal was processed as follows: 
 40-2000 Hz band-pass Butterworth filtering; 
 EMG rectification; 
 Peak interpolation using Hilbert transform function; 
 Smoothing using a Gaussian filter; 
Amplitude and standard deviations of the EMG signal were then computed. The first 
standard deviation was chosen as threshold value to position the trigger, which identify 
the eye blink onset. 
All signals (EEG, EMG, EOG) were segmented from -2000 ms to 1000 ms around the 
trigger to define each epoch of interest (trial). The time-window was chosen to 
possibly include both a Readiness potential, which is supposed to begin at least 1 
second before a movement (Burr, 2005) and the whole eye blink movement dynamics. 
 
3.4.2 Kinematic analysis 
Before segmentation, EOG signal was filtered (band-pass 0,2-8 Hz). Both EMG and 
EOG were baseline corrected (time-interval -1900 -1400). 
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To characterize the kinematic features of the three types of eye blinks, five parameters 
were selected.  
Regarding the EMG signal we computed:  
1. Peak to peak amplitude (on the non rectified signal; A max EMG (µV));  
2. Duration (Δ(t) EMG i-f (ms)). 
Regarding the EOG signal we computed:  
3. Maximal amplitude of the maximum positive peak (A max EOG (µV));  
4.  The time-difference between the EMG onset and the EOG onset (Δ(t) EOG-EMG (ms), 
defined as the time at which the amplitude reaches 5% of the maximum); 
5.  The time-difference between the EMG onset and the time point at which the EOG 
reaches the maximal amplitude (A(t)max EOG (ms)). 
Then in order to assess if the features of the eye blink kinematic significantly varies 
between the three different conditions (blink type), a one-way ANOVA was performed 
for each parameter. Post-hoc comparisons were finally applied to assess significant 
differences between conditions. 
 
Fig. 11.Kinematic characteristics of eyeblinks as described by EOG and EMG 
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3.4.3 EEG analysis 
On each EEG trial, the epoch was visualized within a time-window from -2000 ms to 
2000 ms around the onset of the eye blink and then manually inspected to reject bad 
trials (those in which muscle artefacts, line drifts and double blinks). Artifactual 
channels were removed and then interpolated. 
The continuous EEG signal filtered (band-pass 0.1-45 Hz and notch filter 49-51Hz), 
segmented (according to the previously described time-window) and then down-
sampled at 500 Hz. Sessions belonging to the same condition were concatenated and 
the time interval from -1900 ms to -1400ms was used for baseline correction. The 
Independent Component Analysis (ICA; Makeig, Debener, Onton, & Delorme, 2004) 
was applied in order to remove EMG artifacts and main ocular movements (i.e. 
saccades). 
Subsequent EEG analyses were performed exclusively on Cz (channel 29) since, 
according to the literature, the RP effect is supposed to be maximal on this site. A 
Bootstrap statistics was applied to the baseline in order to obtain two statistical 
thresholds, detecting the significance of negative and positive amplitude values, 
respectively. 
Then, in order to quantify and describe the Readiness Potential, we evaluated four 
parameters:  
1. The cumulative amplitude along the interval time of statistical significance (A 
cumulative Cz (µV)); 
2. The onset time of the significant EEG activity with respect to the negative statistical 
threshold (I Cz (ms)); 
3. The maximum amplitude reached in the interval time between -200 and -100 ms (A 
max Cz (ms));  
4. The slope of the negative drift (Slope RP; assessed only when present, i.e. in the two 
voluntary conditions). 
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Fig 12. RP parameters 
 
Then in order to assess if the features of the RP significantly varies between the three 
different conditions (blink type), a one-way ANOVA was performed for each 
parameter. Post-hoc comparisons (paired t-tests corrected with Bonferroni) were 
finally applied to assess significant differences between conditions. 
3.4.4 Source modeling and statistics 
We then localized the primary electromagnetic sources of scalp EEG activity by 
performing a source modeling.  This modeling was applied to EEG data in order to 
detect the significant cortical activations which generated the scalp EEG signal and to 
estimate the time-space distribution of the cortical current density.  
The conductive head volume was modeled according to the 3-spheres BERG method 
(Berg & Scherg, 1994). According to this method, the inner and outer surfaces of the 
skull and the scalp were represented by three ideal concentric spheres with specific 
and homogeneous conductance.   
The cortical surface is modelled according to a tridimensional grid composed of 5120 
fixed dipoles which are perpendicularly oriented to the cortical surface, adapted to the 
real anatomy of a single subject using the Statistical Parametric Mapping software 
(SPM12). 
It is known that an infinite number of different configurations of sources may explain 
a given electric field measurement; this problematic localization of cortical generators 
is known as inverse problem. In this case, the inverse problem was solved by the 
Weighted Minimum Norm (WMN) constraint applied to an “empirical” Bayesian 
approach (56-58).   
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With this WMN approach, the weights are estimated in such a way to produce the 
source distribution with the minimum power that fits the measurements in a least-
square-error sense. The source- modeling results in a matrix which represents the 
current cortical distribution as a function of time (samples) for each trials belonging to 
the same EEG session. After source-modeling, the significant cortical activations were 
evaluated by applying a non-parametric bootstrap-based statistical procedure to the 
obtained cortical currents.  
First, each source’s activity was centralized and normalized on the mean and standard 
deviation of its baseline level (from -1900 to -1400 ms). Then, surrogate average 
baseline activity was obtained for each source by randomly shuffling pre-stimulus 
samples at the single-trial level (Lv, Simpson & Bell, 2007). At this point, the 
maximum absolute value of the surrogates across all sources was calculated (Pantazis, 
Nichols, Baillet, Leahy, 2005). This entire procedure was repeated 500 times to obtain 
a distribution of 500 bootstraps, corrected for multiple comparisons. The one-tail (1-
α) 100th percentile of the distribution of the maximum absolute values was used to 
estimate a significance threshold T(α) for all normalized sources and samples.  
The spatio-temporal patterns of the significant cortical activations were identified 
according to a well-known anatomical classification (Brodmann Areas) and then 
compared between conditions (within-subject) and between subjects (for each 
condition). 
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Chapter 4 
 
After bad-trial rejection, an average number of 420 spontaneous, 660 voluntary brisk 
and 540 voluntary slow eye blinks per subject was obtained. These “good” eye-blink 
trials were then considered for the analysis of the kinematic characteristics and the RP 
parameters of the three eye blink conditions. 
4.1 Results: kinematic parameters 
In Fig.1, the within-subject variations and the between-subject mean value of the two 
EMG parameters (the peak-to-peak amplitude and the duration of the O.Oculi muscle 
activation related to the blink) for the three conditions are represented. A one-way 
ANOVA was applied in order to assess if the parameters variations between the tree 
conditions were significant.  The statistical comparison revealed no effect of the 
condition for both parameter variations (A max EMG (µV): F=3,37, p=0,062; Δ(t) EMG 
i-f (ms): F=3,3, p=0,064). 
In Fig.2 the within-subject variations and the inter-subject mean value of the three 
EOG parameters for the three conditions are represented. No significant differences 
were found for both the maximum amplitude (A max EOG (µV): F=1,51; p=0,253) and 
the time of the EOG onset with respect to the EMG (Δ(t) EOG-EMG (ms): F=1,84; 
p=0,192). Conversely, the third parameter (time at which EOG reaches its maximum 
amplitude) significantly varied among conditions (A max EOG (µV): F=1,51; p=0,014). 
As expected, the maximum peak of amplitude occurred later in the slow condition with 
respect to the brisk and the spontaneous ones. However, a post-hoc analysis (paired t-
test corrected with Bonferroni) revealed no significant differences among 
comparisons; the effect was indeed most likely driven by two subjects. 
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Fig. 13. EMG parameters in three eyeblink conditions. Left panel shows the values of 
the maximum EMG amplitude while right panel shows the the time-point value at 
which the EMG activity reaches its maximum amplitude, for the three conditions. In 
the upper graph of each panel, mean values for each subject were plotted and, in the 
lower graphs, cumulated values with standard error bars are showed. Mean and 
standard errors related to the above mentioned parameters for each condition are also 
reported. 
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Fig 14. EOG parameters in the three eyeblink conditions. Left panel shows the values 
of the maximum EOG amplitude, Central panel shows the values of the EOG onset 
time with respect to the EMG onset time (corresponding to the zero point). The right 
panel shows the time values at which the EOG reached it maximum amplitude. In the 
upper graph of each panel, mean values for each subject were plotted and, in the lower 
graphs, cumulated values with standard error bars are showed. Mean and standard 
errors related to the above mentioned parameters for each condition are also reported. 
Although the differences did not reach the statistical significance, some trends in the 
group-level data can be observed; in particular, considering the maximum EMG 
amplitude (A max EMG (µV)) brisk and spontaneous eye blinks values were 
comparable and higher than the slow condition (in 5 out of 6 subjects). The EOG 
amplitude, instead, revealed a gradient between the three conditions, with the highest 
values for the brisk and the lowest for the spontaneous condition. Regarding the mean 
eye blink duration, the EMG of the two voluntary conditions showed very similar 
values and were slightly longer than the spontaneous ones (in 4 out of 6 subjects). 
Conversely, spontaneous and brisk eye blinks showed a comparable EOG duration, 
which looked longer than the corresponding slow condition. Furthermore, the 
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difference between the EMG and the EOG onset times showed that in the voluntary 
conditions the eye blink EMG onset always precedes the EOG onset. 
In summary, the kinematic parameters related to the EMG and the EOG did not reveal 
any peculiar pattern associated to a specific eye-blink condition and no statistically 
significant differences between kinematic parameters could be found at the group 
level. 
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4.2 Results: EEG parameters 
In Fig. 15 and 16 the within-subject variations and the inter-subject mean values of the 
four parameters associated to the Readiness Potential for the three conditions are 
represented. A one-way ANOVA with subsequent post-hoc analyses were applied and 
showed that the parameters varied significantly as an effect of condition.  
Specifically, the cumulative amplitude did not significantly differ between the two 
voluntary conditions, but both the brisk and the slow eye blink types showed 
significantly higher values with respect to the spontaneous one (A cumulative Cz (µV): 
F=13,37; p=0,0005; T-test Brisk vs Slow: p=0,1892; T-test Brisk vs Spont: p=0,0038; 
T-test Slow vs Spont: p=0,0034).  
The RP onset time over Cz did not significantly differ between the two voluntary 
conditions. Both the brisk and the slow eye blink types showed a significantly different 
(earlier) onset with respect to the spontaneous one (I Cz (ms): F=15,88; p=0,0002; T-
test Brisk vs Slow: p=0,7553; T-test Brisk vs Spont: p=0,002; T-test Slow vs Spont: 
p=0,0005).  
The maximum amplitude over Cz did not significantly differ between the two voluntary 
conditions, but both the brisk and the slow eye blink types showed significantly higher 
values with respect to the spontaneous one (A max Cz (ms): F=25,95; p=0,0000135; T-
test Brisk vs Slow: p=0,0332; T-test Brisk vs Spont: p=0,0009; T-test Slow vs Spont: 
p=0,0125).  
Since in the spontaneous condition a consistent negative deflection cannot be detected, 
only the two voluntary conditions were considered for comparison of the slope 
parameter. A statistically significant difference of this parameter was found between 
the two voluntary conditions (Slope RP; T-test Brisk vs Slow: p=0,0084). 
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Fig. 15.  EEG parameters in three eye blink conditions. Left panel shows the 
cumulative EEG amplitude while right panel shows the time-point value at which the 
EEG activity become significant, for the three conditions. In the upper graph of each 
panel, mean values for each subject were plotted and, in the lower graphs, cumulated 
values with standard error bars are showed (** corresponds to p<0.003). Mean and 
standard errors related to the above-mentioned parameters for each condition are 
also reported. 
The maximum amplitude over Cz did not differ significantly between the two voluntary 
conditions, but was significantly higher with respect to the maximum amplitude of the 
spontaneous condition (A max Cz (ms): F=25,95; p=0,0000135; T-test Brisk vs Slow: 
p=0,0332; T-test Brisk vs Spont: p=0,0009; T-test Slow vs Spont: p=0,0125).  
Regarding the Slope of the RP, only the two voluntary conditions were considered for 
comparisons, since no presence of a consistent negative deflection was revealed by the 
analyses made on the EEG data for the spontaneous condition. A statistically 
significant difference in the slope was found between the two voluntary conditions 
(Slope RP; T-test Brisk vs Slow: p=0,0084). 
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Fig. 16: EEG parameters in three eye blink conditions. Left panel shows the maximal 
EEG amplitude for the three conditions while right panel shows the slope of the two 
voluntary conditions. In the upper graph of each panel, individual mean values of each 
subject were plotted and, in the lower ones, cumulated values with standard error bars 
are showed (** corresponds to p<0.009; * corresponds to p<0.01). Mean and 
standard errors related to the above-mentioned parameters for each condition are 
also reported. 
In figure 17a, for each subject, the averaged EEG activity preceding the blink onset 
(from -2000ms to 0) is displayed. The three traces corresponding to different eye blink 
conditions are superimposed (black trace corresponding to the spontaneous, red trace 
corresponding to the slow and blue trace corresponding to the brisk) for each channel 
on the basis of the topographical arrangement of the 60-electrodes cap. In each subject, 
the EEG activity, identified in the voluntary conditions (brisk and slow) as the RP, is 
maximal represented over the fronto-central electrodes and in particular at the level of 
the Cz channel (circled in dark gray). For each condition (spontaneous on the left side, 
slow in the middle, brisk on the right side), two color-coded maps showing the 
instantaneous voltage distributions at two selected latencies (-500ms and -200ms 
respectively, voltage color-scaled between +4 and -4 µV, red and blue respectively) 
were also presented.  
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Interestingly, only two subjects (i.e. subject 1 and 6) showed a slight negative voltage 
in the spontaneous condition at both selected latencies (of note, only in subject 6 this 
negative voltage increases at -200ms compared to -500ms). 
As regards to the voluntary conditions, the instantaneous voltage maps always showed 
a voltage increase between the two latencies (i.e. more negative values when 
approaching the blink onset); this negative voltage increase was consistent between 
subjects and well depicted the slowly progressive negative RP course.  
In conclusion, we found a significant difference of the EEG activity preceding the 
onset of the eye blink if the spontaneous and voluntary conditions were compared. 
Specifically, a substantial and consistent slow negative potential (mean voltage -4 µV 
across all subjects) which precedes the intentional eye blink was detected in all 
subjects for both voluntary conditions (brisk and slow). This component was 
maximally represented over fronto-central electrodes. A not-negligible between-
subject variability in latency and maximum amplitude of this negative potential was 
however present. 
Of note, only two subjects showed, also in the spontaneous condition, a negative value 
of the cumulative amplitude (although not significant at the group level). Specifically, 
this negative drift may represent a different phenomenon, since it showed a smaller 
amplitude (as expressed by both amplitude parameters) and a delayed onset if 
compared to the two voluntary conditions.  
  
 
Panel A (Figure 17a): displays of the averaged activity over channel 29 (Cz) in the 
two seconds interval preceding the eye blink for the three conditions;  
Panel B (Figure 17b): voltage scalp topographies at time point -300 ms (300 ms 
preceding the eye blink EMG onset) in the three conditions (those belonging to the 
spontaneous condition in the left column, the ones belonging to the voluntary slow 
in the central column and the topographies relative to the averaged voluntary brisk 
trials on the right). 
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4.3 Source analysis, preliminary results 
In panels A, B and C the source modeling preliminary results referring to a 
representative subject (Subject 5) for the three eye blink types (Brisk, Slow and 
Spontaneous, respectively) ae shown. In each panel, are illustrated (from the top to the 
bottom of the figure):  
- the butterfly plot (the average potential of each channels superimposed) corresponding 
to one of the three types;  
- the corresponding topographical representations of the scalp voltage at four different 
latencies, specifically: the onset time of the RP (calculated as onset of the cumulative 
amplitude over Cz), the time at which the maximum amplitude occurred (150 ms 
before eye blink EMG onset), the EMG eye blink onset time (0 ms) and the time of 
the EOG maximum peak (eye blink maximum amplitude); 
- the relative current density distributions represented in dorsal, posterior and lateral 
views at the aforementioned time points. 
In both the voluntary conditions (brisk and slow) there is an early bilateral activation 
of the precentral frontal area (Brodmann area 4) and the postcentral parietal area 
(Brodmann area 6), with a later activation of bilateral medial and inferior frontal lobes 
(corresponding to the Supplementary eye fields –SEF- and the Frontal eye fields –
FEF-, respectively). The sensorymotor areas (BA 4 and BA 6) remain active until 
eyeblink onset. At this point, a huge current activity become clearly visible over the 
frontal pole (BA 10) and remain active for all the movement duration. A slighter 
activation of the frontal pole starts from 150 to 100 ms before the eyeblink onset can 
also be identified; however, the subsequent more evident activation of the same area 
during the blink movement suggests an artifactual origin rather than a genuine cortical 
generation.   
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Chapter 5 
5.1 Comparison with previous studies 
5.1.1 Blink kinematics 
Healthy subject’s study provides the kinematic characteristics of three different types 
of blink (spontaneous blink, an unintentional movement, and two types of voluntary 
blink, brisk and slow) and the related electro-cortical potentials elicited by these 
movements. 
Kaneko and Sakamoto (1999) studied a quantitative EMG-EOG method to identify 
spontaneous, reflex and voluntary blinks. Their results showed that the three types of 
blink could be identified on the basis of the mean amplitude and duration of EOG and 
EMG signals, and that the voluntary blink significantly differs from the other blink 
types. Specifically, the EMG signal seemed to be more appropriate to make this 
distinction. The spontaneous blink had significantly smaller EMG values than the 
other types of blink for both duration and amplitude parameters. The amplitude and 
the duration of EMG for voluntary blinks were greater than for the other types of blink. 
In disagreement with this previous study, our results did not show statistically 
significant differences in the kinematic characteristics of the three types of blink at the 
group level. 
 Similar to Kaneko and Sakamoto (1999), our experiment involved the use of EMG 
and EOG for recording and evaluation of the blink characteristics and also shared the 
specific electrode placement, the selected kinematic parameters and their 
measurement. However, our study mainly differs for the sample size (6 vs 11 subjects) 
and for the specific instructions provided to perform voluntary movements; Kaneko 
and Sakamoto (1999) asked to perform a voluntary blink as fast and weak as possible. 
Conversely, in our study we tested two intentional blinks which differs for the 
execution modality: the first movement (i.e. brisk) should be executed as fast as 
possible, but without any instruction on how intense/strong the movement should be, 
while the second movement (i.e. slow) should be performed as natural as possible. In 
this perspective, our results are only partially comparable with those of Kaneko and 
Sakamoto (1999). In fact, while these authors found a statistically significant 
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difference between the different types of blink, we did not find a significant difference 
in strictly statistical terms. Looking at the measurements, however, some trends could 
be observed; in particular, voluntary blinks roughly seem to show greater duration and 
amplitude values compared the spontaneous blinks. The lack of statistical significance 
could be due to the training session which may cause the brisk blinks to resemble the 
spontaneous ones and could be also due to the large amount of voluntary trials 
performed by each subject (more than 400 per type) which may include some 
spontaneous blink. The small sample size (6 subjects) should also be taken into 
account to explain the high variability between subjects. Increasing the number of 
subjects could allow to reliably define whether these parameters (i.e. amplitude and 
duration) are able to discriminate between the eyeblink types. 
5.1.2 Blink-related cortical potential 
The role of the cerebral cortex for the preparation and the generation of voluntary blink 
was previously studied by Montagna & Zucconi (1984) and Kaneko and colleagues 
(2004) and recently by Mota & Lins (2017) who evaluate the cortical potential related 
to the voluntary blink movement. They found that voluntary performed eyeblinks were 
preceded by a negative cortical potential that begins approximately 600 ms before the 
onset of EMG activity of the orbicularis oculi muscle.  
The maximum amplitude of this potential was found to be localized over central 
electrodes, in particular at the level of the Cz channel, in line with previous results 
focused on more commonly studied voluntary movements (hand or foot movements). 
This result showed that a voluntary blink did require cortical processes of preparation 
and execution similar to other voluntary movements. While Kaneko and colleagues 
(2004) found that the cortical potential related to the spontaneous movement was 
similar to the one preceding the reflex but strongly different from the one preceding 
the voluntary movement, Montagna & Zucconi (1984) did not find any change in the 
brain activity preceding spontaneous eyeblinks. Hence, these authors concluded that 
the neural processes related to a spontaneous movement take place at a subcortical 
level rather than at the level of primary and supplementary motor areas as it happens 
for a voluntary movement.  
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Our study confirmed the main findings of previous studies. In fact, we observed that a 
negative potential starting on average 900 ms before the execution of a voluntary blink 
was present in all subjects. Since this potential was mainly expressed at the midline 
channels, we decided to analyze this activity at the Cz site also according to the RP 
literature. The selected parameters of amplitude, time onset and slope of the EEG 
potential allowed a good characterization of the Readiness Potential preceding a 
voluntary blink. These parameters, in fact, significantly differed from the 
corresponding ones that described the EEG activity preceding a spontaneous blink.  
Previous studies (for a review see Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006; Verbaarschot, 
Farquhar, Haselager, 2015) have shown that the RP is influenced by several factors, 
as, for example, the attentional level and the “volitional” level involved in the 
performance a specific movement; in this perspective, higher grades of volition turned 
into an increased RP amplitude.  
In our experiment, we assumed that the “brisk condition” in which the blink has to be 
performed rapidly should require more attention and intention than the “slow 
condition”, in which the blink has to be performed as naturally as possible. The 
comparison of the mean amplitude values, computed both as the cumulate both as 
medium amplitude in the time interval between 100 and 200 ms (before the blink), did 
not show any statistically significant differences between the brisk and the slow blink. 
Conversely, a statistically significant difference was found by evaluating the slope of 
the curve of the RP which resulted higher in the brisk compared to the slow brisk. 
Thus, we can infer that the execution of these two blinks, roughly comparable for the 
voluntary purpose but slightly different for the execution modality, critically affects 
the RP characteristics with a significant effect on the slope and a less marked effect on 
the amplitude parameters (where the difference does not reach statistical significance). 
To sum up, besides replicating previous findings, we found that the RP 1) specifically 
preceded intentional movements, 2) was consistent among subjects and 3) was 
partially modulated by the execution modality, as showed by the change of the slope 
parameter.  
Furthermore, in full agreement with Libet’s perspective, what clearly differentiated 
the voluntary from the spontaneous motor acts was the subjective decision to perform 
them. In our experiment, such decision was unconstrained and occurred only when the 
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subject felt to do so. Given that the action execution assumed a self-paced rhythm, we 
always monitored that the subject did not use strategies (e.g. counting) or give an 
explicit rhythmicity to the motor acts. 
Compared to classical Libet’s-like experiments, we decided not to specifically test the 
temporal occurrence of the awareness of the urge to act because this issue can be 
assessed only through a subjective report. However, requiring such report can add an 
additional cognitive dimension, which may be reflected and partially overlap with 
brain activity preceding movement execution (the RP). Moreover, this subjective 
report cannot be interpreted as an objective and reliable measure of the time course of 
the intention generation (Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras, 2002) mainly because this 
estimated temporal onset seems to be dependent on an attentional bias. Therefore, we 
decided not to investigate the time of awareness of intentionality but to focus only on 
the intentionality itself. We assumed the RP as the electrophysiological marker of 
voluntary movements, irrespectively of its specific causal or consequential role, and 
without stepping into the philosophical debate about intentionality and free will. 
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Part 3. Experimental Protocol on DOC and LIS patients 
Chapter 6  
6.1 Disorders of Consciousness 
“The words “conscious” and “consciousness” in philosophical perspective 
are umbrella terms that cover a wide variety of mental phenomena. Both are 
used with a diversity of meanings: the adjective “conscious” is heterogeneous 
in its range, being applied both to whole organisms (creature consciousness) 
and to particular mental states and processes (state consciousness).”27 
An animal, person or other cognitive system may be considered as conscious in 
different ways:28 
1) Sentience. It may be conscious in the generic sense of simply being 
a sentient creature, one capable of sensing and responding to its world. (Armstrong 
1981) 
2) Wakefulness. A subject counts as conscious only if he/she is awake and normally 
alert.   
3) Self-consciousness. A third and yet more demanding sense might define conscious 
creatures as those that are not only aware, but also aware that they are aware, thus 
treating creature consciousness as a form of self-consciousness. (Carruthers 2000) 
4) What it is like. Thomas Nagel's (1974) pivotal “what it is like” criterion captures the 
most private and subjective notion of being a conscious organism. According to Nagel, 
a creature is conscious just if there is “something that it is like” to be that creature, i.e., 
some subjective way the world seems or appears from the creature's mental or 
                                                          
27Van Gulick, R., (2017) "Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition) 
28See, "Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 
Edition) 
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experiential point of view. In this respect, being conscious is just a matter of being an 
experiential creature, of any kind.  
Regarding “state of consciousness”, there are at least three major options:  
1) States one is aware of: states in which some information is available for control of 
behaviour and for guiding verbal reports. (Chalmers, 1996)  
2) Qualitative states: states that involve qualitative or experiential properties of the sort 
often referred to as qualia, or raw sensory feels. 
3) Access consciousness: a state’s being conscious is a matter of its being available for 
interaction with other states, and of the access that one has to its content. (Nagel, 1995) 
From a clinical perspective, the notion of consciousness is reduced into two major 
components: the level of consciousness (i.e., wakefulness or vigilance and arousal) and 
the content of consciousness (i.e., awareness of the self and of the environment) (Plum 
and Posner, 1983). Numerous brainstem neuronal populations that directly project to 
both thalamic and cortical neurons support arousal. Depression of either brainstem or 
global hemispherical function may therefore cause reduced wakefulness. Awareness 
is thought to be dependent upon the functional integrity of the cerebral cortex and its 
reciprocal subcortical connections; each of its many aspects resides to some extent in 
anatomically defined regions of the brain (Majeurs et al. 2005). 
Clinically speaking, the term Disorders of Consciousness (DOCs) refers to a 
heterogeneous group of individuals who have survived severe brain damage 
(Bekinschtein et al., 2009).  In cases of severe cerebrovascular accident (GCA) of 
different aetiology (traumatic, anoxic, haemorrhagic), patients may lose consciousness 
and fall into a comatose state. Coma is a state of non-responsiveness in which patients 
lie with eyes closed and cannot be awakened even when intensively stimulated (Plum 
and Posner 1983). Comatose patients are characterized by a lack of sleep–wake cycles 
(Teasdale and Jennett 1974) and they have neither verbal production nor response to 
command, but can present reflexive responses to painful stimulation. In these patients, 
there is no awareness of self or of the environment. The autonomous functions such as 
breathing and thermoregulation are reduced and patients require respiratory assistance. 
72 
 
Global brain metabolism (i.e. energy use) is also diminished by 50–70% of normal 
(Laureys 2005). Coma results from a diffuse cortical or white matter damage, or from 
a brainstem lesion (Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2010). Coma must last at least 1 h to be 
distinguished from syncope, concussion, or other states of transient unconsciousness. 
The prognosis is often made within 3 days. If the aetiology is traumatic, half of the 
patients who have no chance to recover will die during this short period (Schnakers, 
Majeurs and Laureys, 2004). During the evolving state of consciousness following 
coma, two clinical conditions may be present: vegetative state (VS) or minimally 
conscious state (MCS +/-).29 The Vegetative State (VS) has been recently redefined as 
a syndrome (UWS) (Laureys et al., 2010), and is characterized by the re-opening of 
the eyes (after a coma state) and a partial recovery of the sleep/wake cycle and 
reflexive movements (but with no voluntary/intentional response). On the other hand, 
Minimally Conscious State (MCS) is characterized by fluctuating behavioural signs 
characteristic of a certain degree of awareness of the surrounding environment and, 
sometimes, of residual communicative abilities. (Figure 18) 
 
                                                          
29 MCS was recently subcategorized based on the complexity of patients' behaviours: 
MCS+ describes high-level behavioural responses (i.e., command following, 
intelligible verbalizations or non-functional communication) and MCS- describes low-
level behavioural responses (i.e., visual pursuit, localization of noxious stimulation or 
contingent behaviour such as appropriate smiling or crying to emotional stimuli). (MA 
Bruno, 2011) 
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Figure 18. Schemes of stages after coma 
6.2 The Diagnostic Problem  
The clinical assessment of patients with DOCs critically depends on the patients’ 
residual ability to create a connection with the outside world by conveying their 
subjective experience through motor behaviour. 
However, frequently, the severity of the brain injury is such that the patient, although 
conscious, is unable to perform any kind of movement or adequately understand the 
required command. Therefore, there is a gap between the behaviour and the residual 
cerebral complexity. Voluntary movements may be wrongly interpreted as reflex 
movements and motor responses may be very limited due to a paralysis of all limbs 
(quadriplegia) (Gosseries et al., 2011). Motor responses can also be quickly 
exhaustible and therefore not reproducible (Schnakers et al. 2004). The level of arousal 
can also fluctuate and patients may become drowsy or even fall asleep while evaluating 
them. All these constraints lead to diagnostic errors. Studies have shown that 20–40% 
of patients diagnosed as vegetative showed signs of consciousness when assessed with 
sensitive and reliable standardized tools (consciousness scales) (Childs and Mercer 
1996, Schnakers et al. 2009). Indeed, the distinction between movement or involuntary 
reflex and intentional movement is often difficult to be performed at the bedside and 
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typically requires repeated and careful evaluation. Even when intentional, the 
behavioural manifestations of this population may be very little appreciable. Together 
with the frequent fluctuations in the level of consciousness characteristic of these 
patients, this gap makes the differential diagnosis between VS and MCS subjects very 
challenging. Moreover, patients with DOCs might have deficits in the domain of 
language comprehension and production, such as aphasia.30 This makes even more 
complicated the assessment of consciousness, because the patient might be unable to 
understand the given commands. 
In summary, problems of misdiagnosis could be due to at least three reasons: 
1) The discrimination between VS and MCS hinges upon the (in)ability of any given 
patient to signal their awareness by sustained, reproducible, purposeful or voluntary 
(motor) response. 
2) Arousal and motivation fluctuation  
3) Aphasia 
6.2.1 Behavioural scales 
In order to help clinicians involved in the care of patients with DOCs in the challenging 
task of distinguishing the vegetative (VS) from the minimally conscious state (MCS), 
specialized neurobehavioural rating scales have been developed, providing a reliable 
and valid means of detecting signs of consciousness. However, there are significant 
differences among these scales with respect to diagnostic sensitivity (Majerus, 
Thwaites, Andrews, and Laureys, 2005). The most used ones are the Glasgow Coma 
Scale (GCS), the Coma Near-Coma Scale (CNC-S) (Rappaport et al., 1992), the 
Sensory Modality and Assessment Rehabilitation Technique (SMART; Chatelle et al., 
2010), and the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-r) (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005).  
The Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) remains the most widely and internationally used 
scale of reference nowadays, probably due to its simple and short administration 
(Gosseries et al., 2011). However, it is commonly considered more suitable for the 
                                                          
30 Aphasia is an inability to comprehend and formulate linguistic behaviour because of 
damage to specific brain regions. 
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assessment of the acute state after brain injury than for the monitoring of consciousness 
in the chronic states after coma. 
 
Figure 19. Glasgow Coma Scale 
 
More detailed and specific assessments of patients’ level of consciousness are 
provided mainly by the Coma Near-Coma Scale (CNC-S) (Rappaport et al., 1992), the 
Sensory Modality and Assessment Rehabilitation Technique (SMART) (Chatelle et 
al., 2010), and the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-r) (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005).  
These scales provide a standardized evaluation of the arousal level, of the auditory, 
visual, gustatory, and motor functions, and of the verbalization and communication 
abilities. For each explored sensory/motor modality, scores are provided according to 
the presence/absence of the response (both intentional and reflexive), and to its 
consistency and functional complexity.  
The Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) by Giacino et al. (2004) is considered 
the most suitable scale to assess changes in the level of consciousness. It also provides 
a more fine-grained assessment of the recovery of consciousness. The basic structure 
is similar to the GCS. It includes similar visual, motor and verbal subscales as the 
GCS, but there are three additional sub-scales: an auditory function scale, a 
communication scale, and an arousal scale. Furthermore, the visual, motor, and verbal 
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subscales are much more detailed than they are in the case of the GCS. For example, 
the visual subscale assesses visual startle responses, eye fixation, eye movement, 
visual object localization, and object recognition. These items are critical for 
identifying subtle signs of recovery of consciousness. Furthermore, for each item, fully 
operational definitions are provided and special importance is given to the consistency 
of behaviours assessed via the establishment of baseline observations and repeated 
administration of the item. This two-step procedure (baseline observation followed by 
repeated administration of a given item) allows for a greater certainty that a given 
behaviour is contingent upon a given stimulus and not simply random or reflex; in 
other words, the behaviour has to be reproducible in the same context.  
The CRS-R has been designed to be particularly helpful for discriminating between 
vegetative and minimally conscious state (Gaicino et al., 2004; Kalmar & Giacino, 
2005). A number of specific items are proposed that should permit discrimination 
between vegetative and minimally conscious state (e.g., the observation of item 2 
‘fixation for more than 2 seconds’ on the visual function scale is supposed to 
incompatible with a diagnosis of a vegetative state, but supports a diagnosis of a 
minimally conscious state).  
 
6.2.2 Active Paradigms 
For the reasons described above, behavioural assessment is not sufficient to describe 
the complexity of the disorder. Such conditions in fact require a more tailored 
assessment of the patient's state of consciousness in order to overcome the limits of 
clinical-behavioural evaluation.  
The logic of the consciousness conundrum can be summarized as follows: 
• If a patient exhibits purposeful and reproducible behaviour, then he/she must be aware 
and thus (at the very least) minimally conscious. 
• But what if he/she does not exhibit a purposeful behaviour? Is he/she not conscious? 
This is a fallacious conclusion. 
• The patient could be aware, but unable to produce a motor output. 
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• The absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence. 
Patients with DOC need therefore a careful examination of their state of 
consciousness; one that cannot rely only on behavioural performance. The clinical 
evaluation of patients with DOCs must also involve a quantitative assessment based 
on the principles of single-subject experimental design. 
Several studies provide empirical evidence that functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) offer additional and crucial 
information ancillary to standard clinical assessment of severe brain-injured patients. 
A specific subset of protocol called “active paradigms” (Laureys and Schiff, 2012) 
employs “active tasks” such as mental imagery or selective attention, as an alternative 
to behavioural response to commands.  In particular, in a seminal work (Owen et al., 
2009) researchers showed how mental imagery can modulate patients’ brain activity 
in a manner similar to healthy subjects. They conducted a fMRI study during which 
patients are given verbal instructions to perform two mental imagery tasks at specific 
points during the scan. In the first task, patients are asked to imagine playing tennis, 
while in the second task they are asked to imagine visiting the rooms of their home. 
During the periods that they are asked to imagine playing tennis, significant activity 
was observed in the supplementary motor area. In contrast, when they are asked to 
imagine walking through their home, significant activity is observed in the para-
hippocampal gyrus, the posterior parietal cortex, and the lateral premotor cortex. Their 
neural responses are very similar to those observed in healthy subjects performing the 
same imagery tasks during different scan session (Figure 20).31  
These results confirm that, despite fulfilling the clinical criteria for a 
diagnosis of vegetative state, this patient retains the ability to understand 
                                                          
31 In another study from Monti et al., (2010) Wilful Modulation of Brain Activity in 
Disorders of Consciousness, different mental imagery (motor imager/spatial imagery) 
was used as a channel of communication. In this study, the patients were required to 
give a YES/NO answer to autobiographical questions. Specifically, the patients were 
instructed to perform either motor imagery or spatial imagery (depending on the trial) 
in order to answer YES or NO. Patients produced activations indicative of a correct 
answer in response to 5 of the 6 questions. 
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spoken commands and to respond to them through her brain activity, rather 
than through speech or movement.32 
 
Figure 20. Brain activity in two different tasks. Controls Subject vs VS patient 
6.2.3 Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI) 
Starting from this ground-breaking work on the comprehension of the disorders of 
consciousness, a lot of empirical and clinical work was done in order to fill the gap 
between behavioural and neurophysiological evaluation of the level and the content of 
consciousness (Monti & Vanhaudenhuyse, Coleman, Boly, Pickard, Tshibanda, 2010, 
Stender J et al, 2014). 
In line with this effort, some recent studies (Casali, 2013, Casarotto 2016) have 
developed an objective (brain-based) measurement, independent of behavioural 
feedback, based on brain response (EEG) to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). 
The quantification of the electroencephalographic response of TMS results in an index, 
the “perturbational complexity index” (PCI), that directly gauges the ability of many 
                                                          
32 Owen et al., (2008) Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, Science 1402. 
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functionally specialized modules of the thalamocortical system (differentiation) to 
interact rapidly and effectively (integration), thus producing complex patterns of 
activity. PCI has thus allowed to investigate DOCs in an innovative way and has also 
allowed a stratified classification of clinically-diagnosed non-responsive patients such 
as VS (or UWS) in three subcategories, based on the level of cerebral complexity: “no 
response,” “low complexity,” and “high complexity.” Different types of EEG patterns 
induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) add a fundamental dimension to 
the understanding of the notion of consciousness. The PCI as a measure of complexity 
can be interpreted as an index of brain potential. In particular, “high complexity” sub-
population of patients identified by the PCI would be the category where a dissociation 
between brain-based measures and clinical assessment is most visible. “High-
complexity” group of patients are, in fact, clinically non-responsive, even if they 
exhibit brain potential of consciousness.  
 
 
Figure 21. Representative VS patients resulting from PCI based stratification 
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6.2.4 Intentional Action and Consciousness 
Nowadays, the assessment of consciousness in patients with severe brain injuries 
remains a highly demanding challenge from both the clinical and the theoretical 
perspectives. 
The attribution of consciousness to patients still relies on interpreting bodily 
movements as intentional action, but as a different number of works showed, the 
absence of intentional movements does not imply the absence of consciousness.  
A paradigmatic case is represented by the Locked-In Syndrome (LIS).33 The LIS is a 
complete paralysis of the body resulting from a lesion in the brainstem (American 
Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine, 1995). Gestural and oral communication is 
impossible, but these patients are often able to blink and move their eyes. Even though 
the patients cannot move, their sensations are still intact and they are fully aware of 
both themselves and the surrounding environment (Laureys et al. 2005). The only way 
for these patients to communicate with their environment is through eye movement 
and sometimes also with the tip of a finger. Indeed, some control of the fingers, toes 
or head is generally regained. The patient with LIS is able to answer questions by a 
simple code such as looking down for “no” and up for “yes”, or blinking once for “yes” 
and twice for “no” (Laureys et al., 2005). 
However, in some extreme cases, defined as Total Locked-In Syndrome (CLIS),34 also 
eye movements are impaired. The patient is fully conscious but unable to perform any 
kind of intentional movements. 
 Is he/she no longer conscious? The LIS and CLIS syndromes, although rare, are well-
known syndromes that do not entail lack of consciousness.35 In absence of manifested 
movements, only the examination of the patient’s brain activity36 during so-called 
“active paradigm” might provide information on the patient’s level of consciousness.  
                                                          
33 The aetiology of patients with LIS is of vascular origin nearly 90% of the cases, but 
it can also be traumatic. When the lesion is restricted to the brainstem, cognitive 
functions are fully preserved. If additional cortical lesions are present, the cognitive 
functions associated with these cortical areas may be affected (Schnakers et al. 2008). 
34 Plum and Posner (1966). 
35 Schnakers, C., (2009). 
36 Principal techniques for such investigation are the EEG, fMRI and PET. 
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From a philosophical perspective (see Drayson 2013), the assessment of 
“consciousness” in patients with DOCs where movements are not possible anymore is 
based on the equation between “intentional bodily actions” and “intentional mental 
actions.” In this respect, cognitive functions such as “mental imagery” are used as 
vicarious motor functions. 
One possible critique to this approach is that the equation between mental and motor 
function is misleading. It might be the case that “mental imagery” does not require 
volition. As Owen himself points out, “it is theoretically possible that the mere 
instruction to imagine such actions triggers specific and automatic changes in brain 
activity,” but, he concludes, “the complexity of the commands used here and the 
richness of the imagery that is likely to be required to produce a response that is 
indistinguishable from that of healthy individuals, make this possibility extremely 
unlikely.”37 
This might mean that even if “mental imagery” is not an optimal candidate to test 
volition, it definitely requires conscious processing of the stimulus.  
6.3 Application of Eye-Blink Protocol on DOC Patients 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Our study aims to investigate consciousness capability in patients with DOC from a 
behavioural point of view, by focusing on one of the few preserved movements, the 
eye blink, and from a brain perspective, by assessing whether the spatiotemporal 
cortical dynamics that precede a "reinforced" movement, measured with the EEG, 
exhibit similarities to those found in healthy subjects (i.e. Readiness Potential).  
The strengths of this approach are manifold:  
1) It is focused on movement – eye blink, as the only behavioural channel preserved. 
2)  It evaluates cerebral dynamics preceding an intentional movement, based on tested 
data (healthy controls) and a well-known potential in the literature – the Readiness 
Potential. 
                                                          
37 Owen, AM., (2006). 
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3) It probes volition in an “operant conditioning” protocol, where the learning process is 
accompanied by a supposed intention to move in order to obtain a pleasant stimulation. 
It has been reported that patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs) can learn a 
complex behaviour (Lancioni et al. 2011, 2012), although the conscious and voluntary 
nature of these learning behaviours has never been quantified or verified objectively. 
The definition and implementation of brain activity’s measure that reflects the ability 
of a patient with DOCs to perform a voluntary act has clinical, therapeutic and ethical 
implications.  
A fundamental notion in this study is the one of “operant conditioning.”3839 
Operant conditioning differs from classical conditioning for the fact that the stimulus-
response association in the classical conditioning is based on temporal contiguity and 
frequency of repetition of association. In the classical conditioning framework, the 
learning process is automatic and physiological, without intermediate cognitive 
processes such as stimulus comprehension and stimuli’s expectation. In this respect, 
in the classical conditioning the subject is seen as passive. In the operant conditioning 
framework, the establishment and the enhancement of the associative link between 
stimulus and response is not based just on temporal contiguity, but on the effects 
derived from the response. In the operant conditioning, a voluntary response is then 
followed by a reinforcing positive or negative stimulus. If the reinforcement is 
positive, the likelihood of the response will increase; otherwise, if the reinforcement 
is negative, the response will be extinguished. 
In the positive reinforcement paradigm, cognitive representations are the medium 
through which the subject learns how to obtain a positive stimulus. The term “operant” 
is referred to any active behaviour that operates upon the environment to generate 
consequences.  
Given that patients with DOCs are characterized by a heterogeneous spectrum of 
motor disability, we have identified the blinking as one of the few movements 
preserved in patients with DOCs, and as such, it represents a possible candidate for the 
exploration of the patients’ learning ability.  
                                                          
38  Thorndike, E.L. (1901). “Animal intelligence: An experimental study of the 
associative processes in animals.” Psychological Review Monograph Supplement. 2: 
1–109. 
39 Skinner, B. F. “Science and Human Behaviour,” 1953. New York: MacMillan 
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6.3.2 Experimental Procedure 
To this end, a Matlab graphic user interface (GUI) was developed to detect the 
kinematic characteristic of the blink both online, during operant conditioning protocol, 
and offline, during baseline recording. 
During the first phase of the study, 5 patients (VS (2), MCS (2), EMCS40 (1)) with 
sufficiently preserved spontaneous eye blinking are selected, and recorded sessions are 
targeted to characterize spontaneous motor repertoire baseline. Within each patient-
specific motor repertoire, a distinct kinematic pattern is isolated. This pattern has to be 
reproducible, but not frequent, and therefore usable as a target movement to be 
reinforced (Figure 2). The specific movement must be present in the spontaneous 
repertoire of the patient, but not very frequent, otherwise the conditioning would not 
take place. In fact, if every blink is positively reinforced, the patient would be unable 
to recognize the peculiar movement that generates the reinforcement. 
In particular, those blinks that have deviating characteristics with respect to the normal 
distribution, in terms of amplitude and/or duration, are reinforced online. 
Ideally, if the patient recognizes and learns the relationship between a certain type of 
blink and a positive reinforcement (familiar voices, pleasing music for the patient), the 
distribution of kinematic parameters will progressively move to the less frequent 
selected parameters. 
The conditioning that is to be practiced is therefore “operant”: if the subject recognizes 
the contingency between a specific “outlier”41 blink and the reinforcing stimulus, the 
likelihood of occurrence of the same type of response in the presence of same context 
is expected to increase. 
A further prediction based on the empirical evidence obtained in the control subjects 
is that the blink performed to obtain positive reinforcement might be preceded by a 
preparatory brain activity similar to the one preceding the voluntary blink in the control 
population. 
 
                                                          
40 Emerged from Minimally Conscious State (EMCS). 
41 An outlier is an observation that lies at an abnormal distance from other values in a 
random sample from a population. 
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6.3.3 Stages and description of the experimental protocol 
Experimental procedure: 
• Blink recording (periphery - only EOG) 
• Offline analysis – GUI/ Definition of parameters (both visually and automatically) 
• Creation of a template (average of outlier blinks) 
• Check of template (correlation and amplitude) 
• Stimuli for conditioning 
• Online conditioning  
• Online conditioning and simultaneous EEG recording 
• Offline analysis (behavioural and EEG recording) 
Description of each stage: 
1. To detect eye movements and identify the blink artifact, a vertical electro-oculogram 
(EOG) was recorded by two electrodes placed above and below the eyelid (in line with 
the pupil when the gaze was in central position, to exclude saccadic movements 
(horizontal movements). The electrodes used are very light and disposable surface 
adhesive electrodes, not intrusive for the patient. Peripheral recording is necessary to 
collect a sufficient number of events (blinks) in order to create a distribution of events 
where to individuate outlier blinks.  
2. An offline GUI on Matlab was created to detect and classify blink parameters. 
Specifically, the offline blink analysis follows these steps:  
- Selection of the channels for EOG detection on BrainAmp System 
- Offline trial rejections of non-blinks events (saccades, muscle artifact, etc.) 
- Manually selection of the start and end points of blink events 
- Calculation of different parameters (Figure 22): time to peaks EOG (ms), number of 
blinks (in case of double or triple blinks that can be present in DOC patients), EOG 
duration (ms), EOG area, EOG amplitude referred to the baseline, EOG amplitude 
referred to the onset. Starting from the parameters distribution, it is possible to 
individuate which parameters are outlier compared to the patient’s normal distribution. 
85 
 
 
 
Figure 22. EOG parameters calculated offline 
 
3. After the selection of the blinks’outlier parameters, a template – obtained as the 
average of different outlier blinks - is created to be used for the online reinforcement. 
4. The creation of a template is necessary for the online reinforcement: the online GUI is 
built in such a way as to deliver a stimulus whenever eye blinks detected online match 
with the template. Specifically, blink events have to correlate (0.9 of correlation) with 
the template. Moreover, it is possible to set other parameters, such as amplitude, and 
set a threshold on it in order to create a more accurate match between the chosen outlier 
blink and the selected template. 
5. The selection of stimuli for the online conditioning protocol is based on the anamnestic 
data about each patient. The involvement of relatives and friends in the production of 
stimuli is fundamental, because the aim is to create stimuli with an emotional valence 
for the patient. The requirement for the “audio-files” is that they have not to be too 
long (around 10 sec), otherwise the risk might be to not catch patient’s attention; 
moreover, audio-files have to contain the patient’s name. There are some evidences42 
                                                          
42 Tamura et al., (2016) Hearing subject’s own name induces the late positive 
component of event-related potential and beta power suppression, Brain Research. 
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that the patient’s hearing of his/her own proper name might facilitate a bridge for 
communication.  
6. The online conditioning is based on the GUI created in Matlab, aiming to detect all 
blink events and to reinforce only the ones that match (correlation > 0.9) with the 
template. Whenever the correlation requirement is satisfied, the system provides the 
stimulus. If during the stimulation another blink to reinforce occurs, this is recorded 
as “reinforced event”, but it does not interrupt the stimulation. Each conditioning 
session can last from 10 to 15 minutes, to maximize the efficacy of the stimulation. 
Conditioning sessions are made each day, approximately 2 hours per day, for a period 
of at least 10 days. Every day’s behavioural responses, and any increase of “reinforced 
events,” are monitored.  
7. If the conditioning protocol works as expected, behavioural conditioning sessions will 
be joined to the EEG recording. As for the healthy subjects, it is employed a 64-
channel EEG amplifier (BrainAmp DC, Brain Products, Germany). Sixty surface 
electrodes are placed in a cap according to the International 10/20 System. All 
electrodes are referenced to the linked earlobes. The final purpose of this work is in 
fact to understand if blinks made to obtain a pleasant stimulation (“reinforced events”) 
are preceded by a recordable cerebral activity similar to the Readiness Potential. 
8. Two types of analysis are performed: the first is relative to behavioural results, the 
second is relative to the EEG recordings. 
Behavioural data are stored according to the following parameters for each day of 
conditioning: 
 nr. of sessions 
 type of session (baseline / conditioning in the case of the EEG recording) 
 total events (tot of blinks) 
 reinforced events (blinks reinforced)  
 correlation setting  
 template used  
 duration of session 
9. EEG recording 
As for the healthy subjects, a 64-channel EEG amplifier (BrainAmp DC, Brain 
Products, Germany) is employed. Sixty surface electrodes are placed in a cap 
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according to the International 10/20 System. All electrodes are referenced to the linked 
earlobes and a ground electrode was placed on the forehead. Impedances were kept 
below 5 kΩ and the signal was acquired at a sampling rate of 5000 Hz (DC 
acquisition). To detect eye movements and identify the blink artifact, a vertical 
electrooculogram (EOG) is recorded by two electrodes placed above and below the 
right eyelid (in line with the pupil when the gaze was in central position). 
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6.4 Case 1: DOC patient 
6.4.1 Eye-blink protocol on DOC patient  
The first patient (A.S.) involved in this study is diagnosed as Vegetative State patient 
(VS).43 
(Figure 23) 
                                
Figure 23. CRS’scores: description of behavioural variability during years  
The aetiology of the disorder is traumatic brain injuries.44 Neuroimaging data show 
more post-traumatic bilateral fronto-basal lesions on left hemisphere.  
The patient is peculiar because A.S. is characterized as “high-complexity” by TMS-
EEG evaluation: PCI=0.44. 
Blink-periphery is recorded on different days, during different parts of the day in a 3-
month time period, in order to catch the variability of the behaviour. During the 3-
month recording (for a total of 14 sessions), blink detection has also been refined and 
                                                          
43 The CRS’s score is respectively: 
13/01/2014 – 6*best score (Vegetative State) 
2/09/2016 – 11*best score (Minimally Conscious State) (score for each subscale: 
auditory_2 visual_3 motor_2 oromotor_2 communication_0 arousal_2). 
6/10/2017 – 7 (Vegetative State) 
9/10/2017 – 7 (Vegetative State) 
13/10/2017 – 8 (Vegetative State) 
44 In July 2017, when the conditioning protocol started, 4 years have passed since the 
acute event. 
Date Total 
score 
Auditory Visual Motor Oromotor
/ 
Verbal 
Communica
-tion 
Arousal 
13/01/2014 6* 1 0 2 1 0 2 
02/09/2016 11* 2 3 2 2 0 2 
06/10/2017 7 2 0 2 1 0 2 
09/10/2017 7 2 0 2 1 0 2 
13/10/2017 8 2 1 2 1 0 2 
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optimized, both in the montage,45 and in the type of electrodes used. In particular, at 
the beginning of the recording 4 electrodes (2 EMG and 2 EOG) were employed to 
mimic and compare the montage used in healthy subjects. Later on, a montage 
composed by 2 electrodes (EOG) was employed, to minimize the patient’s discomfort, 
in order not to worsen the blink detection. In this way, the montage is very easy to 
apply and it is not unpleasant for the patient. In addition, detection has improved 
through the employment of adhesive electrodes that, unlike those employed in healthy 
subjects, are lighter, more adherent to the face skin, and faster to apply. 
From blink-periphery recording, a population of outlier blinks is obtained. 
Specifically, in this patient the outlier parameters are those referring to the amplitude. 
(Figure. 24) 
The template is created from the average of those blinks with an amplitude above the 
average amplitude that usually appears with a frequency of 1/10 with respect to a 
“normal” event.  
An EEG baseline is recorded before the beginning of the conditioning behavioural 
protocol, so as to compare it with the EEG during conditioning. 
The conditioning behavioural protocol lasts for 11 days (with an interval of two days 
between days 5 and 6), while the EEG recording is performed in days 8-9-10-11.  
 
Description of different days of conditioning: 
Day 0: EEG baseline.  
Day 1: 5 sessions (4 min, 3 min, 4 min, 11 min, 15 min) amplitude threshold: 1 >500, 
2 >500, 3 >400, 4> 380, 5>350.  
Day 2: 4 sessions (8 min, 10 min, 15 min, 15 min) amplitude threshold: 1>350, 2>320, 
3>320, 4 >320. 
Day 3: 7 sessions (3 min, 5 min, 13 min, 11 min, 13 min, 11 min, 11 min) amplitude 
threshold: 1> 500, 2>400, 3>320, 4>350, 5>380, 6>400, 7>450. 
Day 4: 2 sessions (12 min, 13 min) amplitude threshold: 1>400, 2>450. 
Day 5: 5 sessions (12 min, 11 min, 12 min,12 min,14 min) amplitude threshold:1>400, 
2>450, 3>420, 4>400, 5>400. 
                                                          
45 The first montage employed is EOG/EMG (4 electrodes), then a belly tendon 
montage is employed (3electrodes) and finally just EOG (2 electrodes). 
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Day 6: 6 sessions (5 min, 5 min, 12 min, 12 min, 14 min, 12 min) amplitude 
threshold:1>450, 2>400,3> 380, 4>350, 5>350, 6>400. 
Day 7: 6 sessions (8 min, 12 min, 14 min, 12 min, 20 min, 7 min) amplitude threshold: 
1>400, 2>320, 3>320, 4>320, 5>400, 6>450. 
Day 8: 6 sessions (30 min – EEG baseline, 10 min, 11 min, 8 min, 20 min, 10 min) 
amplitude threshold: 1> 400, 2>320, 2>320, 3>320, 4>320, 5>400. 
Day 9: 4 sessions (20 min – EEG baseline, 12 min, 7 min, 19 min) amplitude threshold: 
1>450, 2>400, 3>350. 
Day 10: 2 sessions (20 min – EEG baseline, 20 min) amplitude threshold: 1> 320. 
Day 11: 5 sessions (20 min – EEG baseline, 8 min, 5 min, 10 min, 21 min) amplitude 
threshold: 1>450, 2>480, 3>500, 4>550. 
 
 
 
                  Fig. 24 Blink template with an amplitude’s threshold (>400) 
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Figure. 25 First column: online blink trace; second column: all blinks detected, 
reinforced blinks (with a threshold on amplitude > 400) 
Stimuli used:  
Conditioning stimuli are audio-files created with the help of relatives, close friends, 
and friends of patient. They are required to record an audio file of the length of 
approximately 8/10 secs that has to contain the patient’s name. Each audio is 
composed in this way: reference to patient + greeting/encouragement, or memory of 
past events, or reference to habitual situations (e.g. work or home environment). All 
audio files are submitted to a closer examination done by a neuropsychologist, who 
indicates which audio can be suitable for the conditioning.  
 
EEG acquisition and analysis: 
EEG recording is done in day 0 (EEG baseline) before the starting of the operant 
conditioning, and on days 8-9-10-11 during the final days of operant conditioning.  
(Baseline) 
0 day – EEG 64 channels 
(Operant conditioning) 
8 – EEG channels FC1 – FCz – FC2 – C1 – CZ – C2 – CP1 – CPz – CP2 – P1 – PZ – 
P2 
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9 – EEG channels FC1 – FCz – FC2 – C1 – CZ – C2 – CP1 – CPz – CP2 – P1 – PZ – 
P2 
10 – EEG channels FC1 – FCz – FC2 – C1 – CZ – C2 – CP1 – CPz – CP2 – P1 – PZ 
– P2 
11 – EEG 64 channels  
Data analysis was performed with MatLab (Math Works Inc., R2015b) and the SSP 
BioMedical Data Analysis Package (SiSyPhus Project; Version 2.0e, 2.1e), developed 
by members and collaborators of TMS-EEG LAB of the Department of Biomedical 
and Clinical Sciences “Luigi Sacco,” University of Milan. 
All signals were filtered using a high-pass, 1st order finite impulse response (FIR) 
filter (corresponding to a detrend). 
Filters 0.1-40 Hz was applied, data were downsampled to 500 Hz. Epochs were split 
to -2000/+1500 ms. The reference was bilobar. Data were baseline corrected to -2000/-
1500 ms. 
Data were pruned with ICA, only component – the one containing blink artifacts - was 
removed. 
After ICA data were low-pass at 5 Hz. Statistical analysis was done after 5 Hz low-
pass filter. 
Trigger positioning: 
To detect the eye blink onset, the EOG signal was processed as follows: 
 40-2000 Hz band-pass Butterworth filtering; 
 Peak interpolation using Hilbert transform function; 
 Smoothing using a Gaussian filter; 
Amplitude of the EOG signal were then computed.  
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Figure. 25 Manual GUI for detection and analysis of EOG 
 
EOG were selected and divided based on amplitudes. In particular, for the EEG 
analysis blinks with the same amplitude were compared. 
These comparisons were done: 
1. Epochs in EEG baseline (day 0) containing EOG of the same amplitude of EOG 
reinforced in day 9 and 10 (amplitude >350). The epochs with EOG >350 of day 0 
were compared with epochs with EOG >350 of days 9 and 10.  
Day 0 – 3 sessions – 1 session 17 >350, 2 session 35>350, 3 session 60>350 (after trial 
rejection)46 
Day 9 + Day 10 (59 + 30) 89 reinforced trial >350 (after trial rejection) 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 Bad trials are considered on the basis of periphery (EOG) and bad EEG signal.  
94 
 
Statistical analysis: 
An unpaired t test (one tail: left) is applied to compare both conditions: baseline and 
operant conditioning. 
8 channels were selected (FC1 – FCz – FC2 – C1 – CZ – C2 – CP1 – CPz – CP2).  
Both the mean average of 8 channels in baseline and 8 channels in the operant 
conditioning sessions and single channels were compared. (Figure. 26, Figure. 27) 
The results show a significant (p value < 0.05*) difference between baseline condition 
sessions and operant conditioning sessions. 
We also employed the Wilcoxon rank-sum test that is a nonparametric alternative to 
the two sample t-test, which is based solely on the order in which the observations 
from the two samples fall. Also, from this non-parametric test we obtained a significant 
difference between the two conditions. (p value respectively for t-test <0.01 and for 
rank-sum <0.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 26 DOC patient 
 
Figure. 26 Average Across Channels (Baseline vs Operant Conditioning sessions) 
                                                                                                                                         
Baseline session (Day 0)                
                                                                                                                                      
Operant Conditioning sessions (Day 9-10)  
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Figure. 27 Single Channels (C1-Cz-C2) 
 (Baseline vs Operant Conditioning sessions)  
 
                 Baseline session (Day 0)                         
        Operant Conditioning sessions (Day 9-10) 
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Figure. 28 EOG (blink >350) Baseline (Day 0) VS Reinforced (Days 9/10) 
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6.5 Case 2: LIS patient 
6.5.1 Eye-blink protocol on LIS patient  
The Locked-In syndrome (LIS), as explained above, is defined by: 1) the presence of 
sustained eye opening; 2) preserved consciousness; 3) aphonia; 4) quadriplegia or 
quadriparesis; and 5) a primary mode of communication that uses saccades or 
blinking.47 This state just superficially resembles the vegetative state: the patient in 
fact appears very impaired at level of motor behaviour except for the eye blink.48 
Given that the patient is conscious but in highly acute physical condition, he/she is 
explicitly asked to perform voluntary eye blink each time for several times. Cued 
protocol is preferable to self-paced one, in this specific case, because the patient, albeit 
conscious, is in highly severe physical condition and the execution of a self-paced task 
could be compromised.  
Methods: 
As for the healthy subjects, a 64-channel EEG amplifier (Nexstim)49 is employed. 
Sixty surface electrodes are placed in a cap according to the International 10/20 
System. All electrodes are referenced to the linked earlobes, and a ground electrode 
was placed on the forehead. Impedances were kept below 5 kΩ and the signal was 
acquired at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. To detect eye movements and identify the 
blink artifact, a vertical electrooculogram (EOG) is recorded by two electrodes placed 
above and below the right eye (in line with the pupil when the gaze was in central 
position)and the eyelid. 
For practical reasons and to try to prevent the patient’s discomfort and fatigue,50 two 
sessions are acquired: Baseline – recording of spontaneous eye blink movements, and 
Voluntary session: recording of voluntary eye-blink movements. 
                                                          
47 Bruno MA., Rev Neurology 2008 
48 In some extreme cases defined as Total locked-in syndrome, or completely locked-
in state (CLIS), the eyes are paralyzed as well. 
49 Different pieces of equipment are due to the different Hospital in which the EEG is 
acquired. LIS patient was in San Gerardo Hospital, Monza. 
50 The patient is in intensive care.  
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EEG recording and analysis: the same analysis applied to DOC patient (A.S.) is 
performed. 
Results: 
Unpaired t-test (left) showed a significant difference (p value < 0.01*) between 
spontaneous and voluntary condition. 
Also for the Wilcoxon rank-sum test there is a significant difference (p value < 0.04*) 
between the two conditions.51 
 
 
Fig. 29 Average Across Channels 
LIS patient (Baseline VS Voluntary Session) 
 
Baseline session 
       
Voluntary session 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
51 LIS patient’s examination is not meant to explore the potentiality for communication 
since LIS patient is able to blink in order to communicate his/her preferences when 
asked to do so (cued protocol). It is just a proof of concept.  
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Figure. 30 Single Channels (C1-Cz-C2) (Baseline VS Voluntary Session) LIS patient 
 
Baseline session 
 
Voluntary session 
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EOG Voluntary 
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Figure 32. Fingerprints of volition (Readiness Potential) in three representative 
subjects. 
As shown in Figure 32, the Readiness Potential can be elicited with (at least) three 
protocols: 
1. Self- paced protocol 
2. Cued/stimulus driven protocol 
3. Operant conditioning protocol 
In healthy subjects, self-paced protocol is employed to elicit the Readiness Potential 
through eye blink movement, during a Libet-style experiment: the subject decides 
when to move based on his/her own free will. 
In LIS (locked-in syndrome) patient, the cued protocol is more suitable to overcome 
the patient’s discomfort and to be sure about the voluntary execution of the task. The 
patient is explicitly asked to make a voluntary eye blink; he/she does not decide when 
to move. 
Finally, in DOC patient, an operant-conditioning protocol is necessary in order to elicit 
a supposed intentional eye blink. Stimulus-response behaviour is supposed to bring 
out a volitional response; the patient might decide to receive positive stimulation. 
Exploring cerebral dynamics before a voluntary movement is relevant both from a 
theoretical perspective—because it characterizes the difference, in neural terms, 
between voluntary processes and spontaneous ones—and from a clinical/experimental 
perspective, especially in DOC patients. The Readiness Potential, qua neural marker 
of volition, can be used as an ancillary measure to assess consciousness in DOC 
patients. 
From the perspective of the diagnostic challenge, a more tailored and clearer definition 
of the disorder of consciousness (DOC) and the possibility of actively conditioning 
residual movements and of categorizing them from intentional to spontaneous, could 
add a new dimension to the concept of “consciousness”. 
From a rehabilitative perspective, as the only preserved channel, the eye blink can be 
used with a communicative aim as a tool for the patient to interact with the surrounding 
environment. In addition, the emergence and the increase of a specific motor pattern 
could determine a global improvement of patient’s arousal, vigilance and attention. 
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Ultimately, from an ethical perspective, the recognition of a voluntary movement is 
crucial to understand the real possibility for the patient to testify for his/her presence. 
Which kind of conscious experience is conveyed through an intentional movement?  
The phenomenal experience, or “what is like” to be in a vegetative state, is not 
communicable through a subjective report. However, it is worth trying to comprehend 
if a motor act, appropriately conditioned, might be a channel for an alternative way of 
communication. 
Although, it remains an open question, if neural preparatory processes before a 
supposedly volitional movement emerged at conscious level. With respect to this, 
further experiments and analysis are required in order to best characterize the 
“Readiness Potential” and its relationship not only with conscious processes, but also 
with intentional ones. Alternative views to the classical interpretation of the Readiness 
Potential seem to suggest that the early part of RP, usually considered as the brain 
preparatory development, might not be a necessary condition for a voluntary action to 
occur (Han-Gue Jo et al., 2014), for at least three reasons: 
1) The Readiness Potential emerged from the average of at least 30/40 trials (e.g. selected 
epochs containing movements), but it is not clearly visible from single trials. What is 
then its actual role in voluntary action? 
2) Could the Readiness Potential be a general mechanism not specific for motor initiation, 
but also for thought and speech initiation? It might be that while for motor initiation, 
it would be easier to time-locked movements and then back averaging, this cannot be 
possible for thought and speech.   
3) Moreover, from recent studies (Alexander et al., 2016) it does not seem neither a 
sufficient requirement for volition, since Readiness Potential-like negative potentials 
seem not to be followed by a movement.  
The actual nature of the Readiness Potential needs a deeper investigation, especially 
given the results obtained from Vegetative State patient. Is Readiness Potential-like 
neural activity a necessary and sufficient condition for an intentional action to emerge? 
It might be that “slow cortical potentials,” including the Readiness Potential, are brain 
phenomena mainly involved in attention, expectation, preparation, that co-occur with 
such cognitive processes without causing them. They might be necessary but not 
sufficient conditions to an intentional action to be carried out.  
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Part 4. Experimental protocol on epileptic patients 
Chapter 7  
7.1 Co-registration of HD-EEG and SEEG 
Cumulating empirical evidences suggests that the Readiness Potential is not generated 
in one central brain region, but instead relies on several cortical and subcortical 
structures that are known to be directly linked with motor control.  Cortical sources of 
the Readiness Potential appear contra-laterally to the movement in the primary motor 
cortex and somatosensory cortex and bilaterally in the SMA pre-SMA and cingulate 
cortex.  
Subcortical generators of the Readiness Potential are found in in the basal ganglia and 
in the thalamus (Rektor, 2001). According to Birbaumer (1990) slow cortical 
potentials such as the Readiness Potential might result as an interplay between cortical 
and subcortical structures. Furthermore, it is possible that not even all the cortical 
sources are captured in the scalp-recorded readiness-potential since some dipoles may 
be hidden from the recording electrodes. Moreover, intracranial data provides a unique 
tool for exploring information about Readiness Potential timing compared to the 
common EEG approach. 
  
7.1.1 Experimental Protocol 
 
The data included in the present study was collected during the pre-surgical evaluation 
of neurosurgical patients with a history of drug-resistant, focal epilepsy.  
Five patients were assessed in total. All subjects were candidates for surgical removal 
of the epileptic focus. During the pre-surgical evaluation, all patients underwent 
individual investigation with simultaneous hd-EEG and recordings performed by 
stereotactically implanted depth multi-lead electrodes (SEEG). In the following, we 
will direct our focus on the SEEG activity. 
SEEG activity was recorded from platinum-iridium semiflexibile multi-contact 
intracerebral electrodes, with a diameter of 0.8 mm, a contact length of 1.5 mm, an 
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inter-contact distance of 2 mm and a maximum of 18 contacts per electrode. The 
performed blink protocol was similar to the one described in section 3.  
In the spontaneous “baseline” phase patients were given the following instructions: 
"In the first phase of the experiment, we will record your cerebral activity at rest, you 
will need to keep your head still and look at a point / image / object in front of you, 
think about what you want, just try to relax and avoid sharp movements of the hands 
and feet, we'll notify you of both the beginning and the end of the recording”. 
In the subsequent voluntary phase these additional instructions were given: “"In this 
new phase of the experiment you will need to keep your head still and look at a point 
/ image / object in front of you, try to relax and  avoid abrupt movements of your feet 
and arms. You will need to make voluntary blinking movements - fast closing and 
eyelid reopening, do not strain too much, try to do it as naturally as possible - also try 
to think whether you want to do it, the blink must be intentional. If you blink 
spontaneously between a voluntary blink, do not worry. Voluntary movements should 
not be too close; try to wait a bit (at least 5 sec) between a blink and the other without 
taking in mind the time passing. Do not worry about the number of movements to be 
performed, but be sure that each blink is performed voluntarily. We will also advise 
you at this stage and at the end of the recording”. 
In the voluntary phase, for these patients, we did not differentiate between brisk and 
slow execution because of time constraints in clinical setting. Moreover, due to the 
limitations of the clinical setting only 15 minutes of each condition could be recorded.  
 
7.1.2 Data analysis 
 
Blink onset was detected by the same algorithm as described in section 3.  
SEEG and hd-EEG data was segmented -3 to 1 seconds with respect to blink onsets. 
Note that the slightly longer pre-blink time window compared to section 3 was chosen 
due to the possibility that the Readiness Potential may have an earlier onset in the 
SEEG signal compared to the scalp recorded EEG. Hd-EEG data was high-pass 
filtered for 0.1 Hz and first inspected manually. Noisy channels were interpolated 
using spherical splines and noisy trials were discarded from further analysis. The data 
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was then low-pass filtered for 5 Hz. ICA was conducted to reduce the prominent blink 
artifact and to remove other artifactual components such as eye movements.  
In order to investigate possible sources of the readiness-potential the SEEG data was 
analysed in the high-frequency broadband (HFB). Data was first high-pass filtered for 
5 Hz. Noisy electrodes were identified manually and discarded. Data was then median 
referenced and cut into epochs. Line noise and its harmonics were removed. Electrodes 
and trials displaying frequent or very strong epileptic activity were again identified 
manually and discarded. After this initial preprocessing, the HFB response was 
obtained following the same procedure as in Golan et al. (2016). The signal was split 
into eight 10 Hz frequency bands between 70 and 150 Hz. For each band  the absolute 
value of its Hilbert transform was calculated and divided by its mean across time. 
Finally, the eight bands were averaged together into a single time course and baseline 
corrected for mean amplitude between -3 to -2.5 seconds prior to the blink. In order to 
assess on which contacts voluntary blinks are preceded by changes in HFB activity the 
single trial traces were averaged over 2 seconds preceding each blink. These mean 
HFB amplitudes were compared between conditions via unpaired t-tests. Due to the 
exploratory nature of this analysis no correction for multiple comparisons is currently 
undertaken. All contacts exhibiting a p-value <= 0.01 are considered significant and 
will be discussed below.  
 
 
7.1.3 Results 
 
Of the five assessed patients four had at least one contact exhibiting significant 
differences in the neural activity preceding spontaneous and voluntary blinks. Patient 
1 had a right posterior exploration covering large parts of the visual cortex (see Figure 
33). Several of these contacts exhibited very strong effects in the 2 seconds preceding 
voluntary blinks. The respective contacts were located in the pericalcarine and the 
lateral occipital cortex, the cuneus and the precuneus. Additional effects were found 
on contacts in the right lingual and supramarginal cortex. Finally, there was one 
contact in the right isthmus cingulate also exhibiting RP-like activity (Figure 33). 
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Patient 2 had a left frontal exploration (Figure 33). Several of these contacts were in 
the anterior cingulate cortex yet none of them showed the effect of interest. Two 
interesting contacts were found in the left superior frontal and rostral middle frontal 
cortex, however. Although the difference between spontaneous and voluntary blinks 
is not very pronounced the systematic difference between conditions still hints at the 
possibility that these frontal areas are involved in the RP process.  
Patient 3 had a right occipito-parieto-temporal exploration not unsimilar to patient 1 
(data not shown). Also for this patient a contact was found in the right cuneus 
exhibiting a strong preparatory effect for voluntary blinks. A second significant 
contact was found in  the right superior parietal cortex. Patient 4 had a right fronto-
temporal exploration (data not shown).  The only significant effect was found on a 
contact in the right supramarginal cortex.  
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Figure 33. Two representative patients with implanted SEEG. The full exploration 
for each patient is depicted on a translucent hemisphere. Each gray dot depicts one 
contact on a SEEG rod. Contacts showing significant differences between 
spontaneous and voluntary blinks in a 2 second time window prior to the event are 
highlighted in red. For each patient two of the significant effects are illustrated in 
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more detail in the insets. Each inset depicts a horizontal slice of the patient’s brain 
with the significant contact once again highlighted in red. Next to it is the average 
HFB (high-frequency band) activity for the spontaneous (black) and voluntary (red) 
condition recorded from this contact. Blink onset is marked with a yellow vertical 
line. The 2 second time window over which mean HFB amplitude was assessed is 
filled in with pale yellow. 
 
7.1.4 Discussion 
From the preliminary results sketched above it is clear that voluntary eye blinks are 
processed differently compared to spontaneous eye blinks in the few seconds leading 
up to the event. This confirms the previously described EEG results obtained both in 
healthy subjects, in the LIS patient and in the DOC patient. However, there are also 
several noteworthy differences in intracranial activity in respect to the information 
obtained from EEG recordings.  
Specifically, brain activity preceding voluntary movement (eye blink) seems to be 
spread over diverse areas which are not usually related to movement preparation and 
execution. As shown in Figure 33, significant differences in HFB between spontaneous 
and voluntary blinks in a 2 second time window prior to the movement, appeared both 
in visual and frontal areas that are not usually involved in movement. 
It might be possible that the “voluntary” pathway goes through different areas, before 
reaching the intended movement. Changes in high-frequency power might represent 
an aspecific brain modulation (e.g. change in neurons firing rate) correlated with 
intentional processes.  
An interesting aspect emerging from the intracranial data is the information relative to 
“Readiness Potential” timing. HFB decrease seems to start earlier - around 2000 ms 
before the intentional movement - than the “classical” Readiness Potential observed 
on the scalp for voluntary eye blink. This might suggest a more spread involvement of 
different areas in the actual performance of intentional movement. Moreover, since 
differentiation in brain activity in non-motor areas seems to start earlier in comparison 
to the “Readiness Potential” in motor areas this might suggest that the “Readiness 
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Potential” on the scalp could represent the summation of different concomitant 
processes in different areas.  
Another intriguing aspect of the results is the fact that several of the contacts showing 
a readiness potential effect were also “blink sensitive”, i.e., there was a prominent 
transient of neural activity in response to the blink itself. Most of these contacts were 
located in the posterior visual cortex. Since HFB difference in spontaneous and 
voluntary condition it is present specifically in “blink sensitive contacts” this might 
shape the quest of volition from another perspective. It could be plausible that specific 
brain region - involved in the production and processing of a certain movement or 
event - (e.g. visual areas for blink) could be dynamically involved in the volitional 
process.  
A lot of different exploration, in different areas, has to be done in order to confirm this 
hypothesis, but this is a promising starting point.  
In addition, “blink” as a dynamical continuum from automatic/spontaneous to 
intentional movement, represents a new powerful tool that in combination with 
intracranial exploration, could inform about different neuronal way in which an 
intentional act can be performed.  
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Part 5. 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, we performed four kind of empirical investigations: 
1. Experiment on healthy subjects (EEG) 
2. Experiment on DOC patient (EEG) 
3. Experiment on LIS patient (EEG) 
4. Experiment on epileptic patients (SEEG) 
Our study on healthy subjects and LIS patient, characterized and confirmed previous 
results about the existence of Readiness Potential’s like activity preceding voluntary 
eye-blinks while this activity is absent for spontaneous eye-blinks. 
The investigation of DOC patient provides precious findings about the existence of 
Readiness Potentials’ like activity in Vegetative State patient (VS) with an high level 
of brain complexity (PCI=0.44) that has never been proven to date.  
We demonstrated that it is possible to modify the movement “quality” – from 
spontaneous to intentional – in an operant conditioning protocol as Readiness Potential 
presence before conditioned blinks might suggest. 
Preliminary intracranial explorations, showed that Readiness Potential is not only 
located in specifically motor-driven areas (Cz and neighbouring electrodes) but it also 
appears in non-motor areas. This might indicates that the volitional processes is more 
complex and distributed among different areas. (Figure 34)  
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Figure 34. Topoplot of spontaneous blink conditions and voluntary blink condition 
in a time period between -1500 ms and -100 ms before movement of one 
representative subject. 
In the debate about “Readiness Potential”, we added a pivotal dimension: the 
investigation of the spontaneous movement. Blink, in fact, provides an inestimable tool 
to explore the movement-related cortical potential taking in account, for the first time, 
the systematic assessment of spontaneous movements. Starting from Kornhuber & 
Deecke investigation of brain cortical activity preceding intentional movement, the 
analysis of movement-related cortical potentials (MRCPs) was always focused on 
finger or hand movements without taking in account the comparison between 
intentional and spontaneous movements such as eye-blink movements.  
If “Readiness Potential”, in the “alternative” framework, is interpreted as the average 
of stochastic fluctuations time locked with the onset of the movement, why this random 
fluctuation do not appear before spontaneous movement? 
What is missing in Schurger’s empirical investigation is a specific claim about non-
intentional movements. If spontaneous fluctuations are characteristic of brain activity 
regardless of the activity that is about to happen, why non-intentional blinks were not 
preceded by Readiness Potential? In this respect, blink – as one of the few motor act 
that can be performed either spontaneously and intentionally – is a powerful tool to 
employ in the deeper investigation of the complex brain dynamics of intentional action. 
In DOC patients, “blink” is often one of the few preserved movements. Blink-related 
cortical activity in this respect became an important and powerful index of brain 
activity. Detecting a progressive increase of volition (up to the levels obtained in 
healthy subjects during voluntary blinks) during the course of the conditioning 
sessions will in fact indicate that patients’ blinking might reflect a conscious act.   
To which degree intentionality is linked with specific neural activity, and at which 
moment the “intention to move” emerges, remains an open question of fundamental 
empirical and theoretical importance. 
In conclusion, the novelty of our empirical investigation rely on sketching a new 
theoretical and empirical framework of an old but gold neuroscientific problem – how 
intentionality emerges from brain structures – perturbing the brain with the most 
simple movement: the eye blink. 
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